

HERMAN RAPAPORT

*Heidegger
& Derrida*

Reflections on Time and Language

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&
Derrida*

REFLECTIONS ON

TIME AND LANGUAGE

HERMAN RAPAPORT

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In Memory of My Parents

Josef Max Rapaport

Betti Margarete Rapaport

But if time is to show an ambiguity
of *being* and the otherwise than being, its
temporalization is to be conceived not
as essence, but as Saying.

—Emmanuel Levinas,
Otherwise Than Being
or Beyond Essence

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INTRODUCTION

In this study I focus on what for me had always been a very obscure topic: Martin Heidegger's conceptions of time and their relationship to deconstruction. Anyone familiar with the critical writings on Heidegger will recall that far more has been written on just about every aspect of his philosophy than on what *Being and Time* suggests is the most pressing for modern thought: the question of temporality. Moreover, it has occurred to me that if one wanted to find some direct philosophical connections to an immediate predecessor whose works are crucial in determining the directions or latitudes that deconstruction has taken, one would necessarily be driven to come to terms with explicit and implicit claims made in Jacques Derrida's writings about Heidegger's handling of temporality and the degree to which that did or did not dismantle the history of ontological reflection. What I had not initially counted on was that such an approach might yield an interpretation which would span all the major phases of Derrida's philosophical career and help us better grasp even those essays which are not explicitly commenting on materials in Heidegger's work. What I discovered, somewhat to my surprise, is that the question of time is far more fundamental to a philosophical understanding of deconstruction than one might at first suppose.

My text is primarily philosophical in orientation, though I approach philosophy often from the standpoint of what may be called literary problematics. As someone trained in literary studies, I naturally gravitate to stylistic features and questions of language that have been of importance to literary scholars working in the field of critical theory, and at times I also bring in discussion of literary texts. However, I have also made it a point not to let literary wordplay dominate my analyses nor to let my style imitate a deconstructionist discourse too closely.

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'Having written a number of pieces in the past that are aggressively playful and performative, I wanted, in this study, to write in a different mode, while, of course, not completely losing sight of how both Heidegger and Derrida seriously play with language in order to put distance between themselves and a certain philosophical tradition.

A major problem I had to confront even in the early stages of writing this book was how to handle the gravitational pull of traditional intellectual history. One of my motivations in writing this study was, of course, to clarify the connections of deconstruction to Heideggerian philosophy. At the same time, it is obvious that deconstruction aggressively eludes the kind of theoretical referentiality to precursors typical of many other philosophical critiques—for example, the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein or Richard Rorty. Most troublesome, from this perspective, is the meticulous deconstruction of intellectual history performed by Derrida in *The Post Card*, wherein his relation to Heidegger, another dismantler of this kind of history, is explicitly so disarticulated that it raises disturbing ironies for the kind of project on which I have been working. Thus I have had to consider the problem of how to write an intellectual history about figures who have themselves annihilated the philosophical grounds upon which such a study might be conceived.

That my study focuses on time has certain advantages with respect to this problem. The main advantage is that instead of treating the deconstruction of intellectual history as a universalized aporia or double bind that cannot be historically negotiated, I am able to consider it as a reinscription of a deconstructive set of temporal proximities which break with the determinability of any one critical or philosophical temporal model. Especially in relation to Heidegger's considerations of time in his later writings, so important to Derrida's *The Post Card*, it would be quite mistaken to think that Derrida's temporal or familial double binds ought to be considered as setting a new "standard time," however unteleological, to which all dimensions of intellectual history are to be subordinated or limited. If one were to conclude from Derrida's dismantling of the chronology underwriting traditional "intellectual history" that such a history is no longer thinkable except from an un-

decidable set of problematics—for example, that of who is signing for whom in Plato or who is fathering what psychoanalysis by whom in Freud—one would, then, be encouraging a metaphysical recovery of time as a universal or objectified framework that has substituted one set of temporal aporias (that of Oedipus) for another—for example, those of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and perhaps even Heidegger. That Derrida himself shows the chronological aporias of an intellectual family romance to be as applicable to Socrates and Plato as they are to Freud and to Derrida himself should not suggest that an incipient universalization of genealogical temporality is being undertaken even as intellectual history in its traditional senses is being discredited and discarded. For in our considerations of the historical stances between Heidegger and Derrida it will become evident that even the genealogical or Oedipal critique of *The Post Card* is but part of a much more complex set of historical or temporal interrelations eluding not only *Geistesgeschichte* but the genealogical psychoanalysis of the double bind, while, at the same time, participating in them.

Throughout this study I focus on a number of latitudes wherein Derrida's texts are being positioned and repositioned along the lines of their turning toward and away from Heidegger in the context of the problematic of temporality which, as we recall, Heidegger abrogated in *Being and Time*. What is not well recognized is that Heidegger developed the problematic of time at great length in later studies and particularly with respect to language. In the paragraphs that follow, I will outline other ways in which my chapters relate through a brief overview of Heidegger, Derrida, and the question of temporality.

Destruction and Deconstruction

In the design for the argument of *Being and Time*, Martin Heidegger contemplates the question of Being in the context of two tasks which will divide the treatise. Part 1 is intended to be a discussion of “the interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality, and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being,” and part 2 is

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meant to be a demonstration of the “basic features of a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology [*phänomenologischen Destruktion der Geschichte der Ontologie*] with the problematic of Temporality as our clue [*Leitfaden*].”¹ Exactly what Heidegger meant by “the destruction of the history of ontology” is not clear, though the program for part 2 sounds menacing enough. The suggestion is made that through a particular turn on the concept of temporality the ontological project of part 1 will be sublated, supported, and at the same time purified with an even more rigorous critique of ontology. Certainly Albert Hofstadter has this in mind when in his introduction to the English translation of Heidegger’s *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* he makes the following remarks on ontology and temporality.

In ancient ontology being is understood as presence, which is itself understood in terms of this common time, the time which on the surface seems so important in everyday life and productive activity, although the truth is that there is a profounder, more original, truer time at its foundation, which it has forgotten. Heidegger devotes much effort to the analysis of Aristotle’s treatise on time and to the phenomenological examination of its definition of time, pressing on toward the original time—temporality as ecstatic-horizonal and eventually as ecstatic-horizonal Temporality—from which, as horizon, a more authentic realization of the meaning of being can be attained. Here, too, then, we find the *destruction of a fundamental part of traditional ontology and its de-construction, down to its original rooting in Temporality.*²

At the end of this English edition of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, however, an afterword appears by F. W. von Herrmann, the German editor of this volume, and oddly enough, Herrmann entirely contradicts Hofstadter’s assessments. “This lets us see *that* and *how* the treatment of the question of being and of the analytic of *Dasein* pertaining to it arises from a more original appropriation of the Western tradition, of the orientation of its metaphysical-ontological inquiry, and not actually from motives germane to existential philosophy or the phenomenology of consciousness.”³ Given Herrmann’s view, anyone who

would imagine Heidegger a deconstructionist in the earlier phases of his career would evidently be guilty of a profound and basic misunderstanding. And indeed, this difference of opinion between Hofstadter and Herrmann typifies a conflict of interpretations which underwrites much Heidegger scholarship and also figures, to some degree, in readings of Derrida.

Rodolphe Gasché, in *The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection*, for example, implicitly lends support to Herrmann when in explaining the meaning of Heidegger's term "destruction" he quotes *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, presupposing that this text and *Being and Time* are so conceptually congruent that one text can accurately gloss the other. The passage Gasché quotes from reads as follows.

It is for this reason that all philosophical discussion, even the most radical attempt to begin all over again, is pervaded by traditional concepts and thus by traditional horizons and traditional angles of approach, which we cannot assume with unquestionable certainty to have arisen originally and genuinely from the domain of being and the constitution of being they claim to comprehend. It is for this reason that there necessarily belongs to the conceptual interpretation of being and its structures, that is, to the reductive construction of being a *destruction*—a critical process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be employed, are de-constructed [*kritischer Abbau*] down to the sources from which they were drawn. Only by means of this destruction can ontology fully assure itself in a phenomenological way of the genuine character of its concepts.⁴

This lengthy passage, in which Gasché's quotation (the last two sentences) takes place, immediately discloses that in comparison with *Being and Time*'s much more aggressive tone and boldness of purpose, *Basic Problems* is a more cautious and far less ambitious text, perhaps because it is still very closely attached to phenomenological method, whereas *Being and Time* has taken more distance from it.⁵ Indeed, as I will demonstrate in some detail in chapter 2, *Basic Problems* is a conservative version of *Being and Time*, wherein opportunities for breaking with the history of ontology are, in fact, carefully avoided

rather than explored as in the latter. Hence one could debate Gasché's definition of "destruction" in Heidegger's *Being and Time* as not being far more violent in intent than "the dismantling of tradition" for the sake of critical inspection of its foundations or the "systematic removal or dismantling of the concealments of the meaning of Being by the history of ontology." Indeed, the program for part 2 of the design for *Being and Time* could be read so that the temporal clue functioned not merely to inspect the foundations of tradition by careful dissection but violently to demolish the conceptual apparatus of metaphysics embedded in the history of ontology. When, as Gasché notes, Heidegger used the term *Zerstörung* at a conference in 1929 rather than the word *Destruktion*, the much more violent connotations of *Zerstörung* may have been more apt in disclosing what Heidegger had conceived when he projected the second part of the design for *Being and Time*.

That Gasché's definition of "destruction" is crucial for a particular understanding of "deconstruction" is self-evident, but its significance is not, since how one understands Heideggerian "destruction" establishes not just a particular relation between words but between the philosophies in general of Derrida and Heidegger. In Gasché's study, the result of defining Heidegger's term "destruction" in the context of *Basic Problems* has predictable results. It leads to a highly defined and static difference between a Heideggerian philosophy that appears conservatively tied to the tradition of metaphysics and a deconstructive philosophy that is considered much more adroit in challenging the history of ontology. "If, as Derrida writes in *Writing and Difference*, referring to the *Cartesian Meditations*, that 'in criticizing classical metaphysics, phenomenology accomplishes the most profound project of metaphysics,' then the same can be said of Heidegger's destruction of the Occidental tradition of ontology and of his focus on Being."⁶ Gasché's conclusion is that even if "destruction" and "deconstruction" analogously disrupt the foundations of thought, they are very different concepts, because unlike "deconstruction" the Heideggerian notion of "destruction" leads to "an ever more fundamental notion of the essence of what is under consideration." Deconstruction, unlike destruction, searches for "ultimate foundations . . . exterior to metaphysics."⁷

Of course, Derrida himself has taken some definite positions on his relationship with Heideggerian philosophy, and when Gasché cites him for authority it has to be recollected that Derrida has, in fact, taken many *different* positions on whether deconstruction has close ties to Heidegger or whether it is something not to be confused with Heideggerian thought. Derrida participates, as it were, in an ongoing debate with explicit and implicit claims on the overall evaluation of Heidegger's corpus with respect to the question of his radicality as a thinker whose work destabilizes and undermines the presuppositions upon which Western philosophy has been established. Derrida's evaluation is distinctive in that instead of choosing between the two options that, for example, Hofstadter and Herrmann (or Gasché) delimit, it plays with their "difference" of opinion and thereby takes on many directions or perspectives which would appear to be merely incompatible.

For example, one can find passages in Derrida's work that are hostile to the association of Heideggerian thinking with deconstruction. In *The Post Card* Derrida criticizes those French translators who have made an identification between Heidegger's notion of destruction and Derrida's formulation of the term "deconstruction":

Abbauen: the word that certain French Heideggerians recently have translated as "to deconstruct," as if all were in all, and always ahead of the caravan. It is true that this translation is not simply illegitimate once it has been envisaged (rather recently). Unless one manipulates an aftereffect [*l'après-coup*] precisely in order to assimilate, and in order to reconstruct that which is difficult to assimilate.⁸

In a similarly sarcastic vein, Derrida remarks, "One puts one's hand on a mark [or brand name], and reapplies everywhere."⁹ These remarks are part of Derrida's insistence that deconstruction is *different* from Heideggerian philosophizing, that one cannot reduce Derridean terms to their sources of inspiration, if, indeed, such sources are to be located at all. A major position that Derrida implies with respect to Heidegger is that Heidegger never broached deconstruction as developed in such works as *Of Grammatology*, *Margins of Philosophy*, *Glas*, or *The Post*

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Card, because Heidegger never truly embarked on part two of the philosophical itinerary outlined in *Being and Time*. In other words, Derrida contradicts Hofstadter's assumption that we may read the complete *Being and Time* by way of examining the volume and its supplements, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, as the completion of a single treatise that does, in fact, fulfill the itinerary written at the outset of *Being and Time*, wherein the history of ontology is subjected to a phenomenological destruction by means of a temporal clue. In denying Hofstadter's not untypical "revisionary" reading of Heidegger, the Derridean perspective would necessarily have to claim that the supplements to *Being and Time* are not, in fact, continuations of *Being and Time*'s more radical impulses but symptoms of Heidegger's failure to bring such philosophical aims to fruition.

Despite an antipathy to the blanket identification of Heideggerian thinking with deconstruction, there are also many instances in which Derrida elicits such comparisons and establishes such a Heideggerian lineage for deconstructive thought. In a recent interview with American critics published by the Society for Critical Exchange, Derrida related that "the word 'deconstruction' itself has a whole genealogy. It's an old French word which had fallen out of use, that I used for the first time, so to speak, in this particular sense. But I did so with the sense that I was translating and deforming a word of Freud's and a word of Heidegger's."¹⁰ And, more recently, in *De l'esprit* Derrida directly translates Heidegger's term *Destruktion* into French as *déconstruction*.¹¹ These examples are surprisingly odd, given what we have just quoted from *The Post Card*, and they suggest that readers like Hofstadter are, indeed, expressing views which are from Derrida's perspective quoted above not entirely without merit. I cite these somewhat contradictory statements by Derrida in order to introduce my conviction that peculiar to Derrida's stance on Heidegger is that instead of choosing between the two options of a radical or conservative Heidegger delimited by scholars like Hofstadter and Herrmann, Derrida plays with the "difference" of such a choice and thereby allows himself to pursue simultaneous perspectives or directions which would appear to be merely incompatible or untenable. In this way he disarticulates the decidability of any

intellectual “event” that would constitute the historical difference between deconstruction and Heideggerian thought.

Indeed, Derrida’s remarks concerning the filiation of the word “deconstruction” belong to a much larger field of interpretations about Heidegger, suggesting that Heidegger’s corpus approximates an archaeological site with heterogeneous strata. From Derrida’s perspective contradictory positions about Heidegger may be asserted, since the “ground” of Heidegger’s philosophy is an incompatible interplay of strata which are but what remains of specific philosophical moments. In this sense, the matter is not a question of choosing between positions such as those of Hofstadter or Herrmann but of recognizing the possibility of their simultaneity or synchronicity in Heidegger’s work. Clearly, when Derrida excoriates the bandying of deconstruction as a “brand-name” applied to Heidegger, or what amounts to a slick packaging technique, what is largely at issue is the reduction that takes sides on the intellectual historical debate between scholars like Hofstadter and Herrmann, as if one were justified in assuming that from a Heideggerian orientation one could simply make such easy determinations. And when Derrida explains in the interview with the Society for Critical Exchange that deconstruction relates to words in Heidegger and Freud, he destabilizes the interlocutor’s presupposition that deconstruction is something separate from other ways of thinking, that the “place” of deconstruction can be restricted or easily delimited. This, in fact, is the common denominator between the two “contradictory” passages above: Derrida’s strong antipathy to restrict deconstruction to a place of its own (*le propre*).

Heidegger’s Turns

W. J. Richardson is well known for having first made the distinction between a Heidegger I and a Heidegger II, and ever since there has been controversy about which Heidegger is radical and which is conservative.¹² Moreover, this controversy has concerned the identification of what Heidegger himself has called “the turn.” Although the “turn” in Heidegger is not reducible to any given text, line, or idea, Heidegger scholars have debated several understandings of what this turn

is and where it occurs in Heidegger. Indeed, the question of deconstruction's relation to Heideggerian thought depends largely on the extent to which Derrida not only reads these turns but evaluates them in terms of the Heideggerian "destruction" of the history of ontology. Anticipating later remarks, I should clarify that I think Derrida makes different evaluations of this "destruction" depending upon which turn he is examining. Hence any static distinction made between Derridean deconstruction and Heideggerian philosophy will quickly be perceived to be inadequate, since the relationships between these modes of thinking shift their positions or proximities over time. This is important, since most critical approaches to the relation between Derrida and Heidegger have tended to be spatially motivated as territorial determinations rather than temporal modulations. As another note of clarification, let me add that for me the Heideggerian turns are all to be read with respect to the temporal clue in the proposed second part of the design in *Being and Time*. This is not to be interpreted as a crude reduction but as a certain bracketing of other problematics for the sake of focusing on the question of temporality which, as I see it, takes place in time as time.

Before outlining how the turns are developed in my study, we ought to review briefly some of the citations of the turn by Heidegger interpreters critical to an understanding of deconstruction's relationship to Heideggerian thinking. In doing so we will move retrogressively from Heidegger's explicit announcement of the turn in the essay "The Turning" included in the volume *Die Technik und die Kehre* (1962). As is well known, this essay discusses how being turns into "the oblivion of its coming to presence" and argues that in the coming to presence of Being, Being "turns counter to the truth of its coming to presence." Moreover, this turning counter to the truth has to be considered with respect to language "within which man's essence is first able to correspond at all to Being, and its claim, and, in corresponding, to belong to Being." Heidegger infers that language as technical apparatus facilitates a "turning" in which "danger" comes to pass in "the turning of the oblivion of Being."¹³ In *Heidegger and the Tradition*, Werner Marx acknowledges that this turn separates the "earlier" from the "later" Heidegger, though Marx doubts that the turn actually

does much more than mystify and obscure what was more clearly laid out in *Being and Time*.¹⁴

In "The Letter on Humanism" of the mid-1940s, however, the turn in Heidegger already consisted in contemplating language as the "house of Being," a turn reflected, too, in *Holzwege* and *On the Way to Language*. Maurice Blanchot acknowledges this turn in *L'entretien infini*. "Writing only begins when language, returning to itself [*retourne sur lui-même*], disappears in its being shown and apprehended."¹⁵ For Blanchot the Heideggerian turn is the turning of the language of metaphysics upon itself which results in the disarticulation of metaphysics. Similarly, in *Of Grammatology* Derrida acknowledges such a turn when he writes that Heidegger's question of Being is contextualized within a "system of languages and an historically determined 'significance,'" privileging assumptions through which Being appears. Heidegger analyzes these languages because he suspects "Western metaphysics, as the limitation of the sense of being within the field of presence, is produced as the domination of a linguistic form."¹⁶ In examining this linguistic form, Heidegger deliberately does violence to metaphysics. Certainly, the French poststructuralist reception of Heidegger is largely based on this interpretation of the Heideggerian turn as a linguistic turn. However, it too is controversial even for thinkers sympathetic to such a reading of Heidegger. Paul Ricoeur, for example, maintains that the turn to language cannot be divorced from Heidegger's early formulations. "The question of Being and the self, of which we read in the introduction of *Being and Time*, keeps ruling the philosophy of the later Heidegger."¹⁷

In addition to such concerns, the linguistic turn is inherently part of a most difficult Heideggerian problem, the "ontological difference," or, difference between beings and Being. The essays "The Anaximander Fragment" [from *Holzwege*] and "Logos" [from *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (1954)] are especially important in considering "difference" from the perspective of language, and later texts such as *On the Way to Language* and *Identity and Difference* develop further various thoughts in the earlier works. However, long before *Holzwege*, Heidegger had broached the question of ontological difference in *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935) and *Vom Wesen des Grundes* [*Of the*

Essence of Reasons] (1928), not to mention sketches and notes associated with *Being and Time*. Derrida's well-known essay "La différance" could be viewed as a development of the ontological difference in the context of the linguistic turn made in "The Anaximander Fragment," as if to say that the ontological difference itself becomes a crucial moment in this turn at the point when Heidegger considers questions of language. However, Heidegger scholars, particularly in Germany, often put much more stress on the problematic of the ontological difference as something to which the considerations of language are subordinated, since the ontological difference becomes the means whereby a turn, itself planned at the outset of *Being and Time*, was to be made from being to Being.¹⁸

In his introduction to *On Heidegger and Language*, Joseph Kockelmans discusses the "ontological turn" in this way:

Heidegger hoped that a careful analysis of man's Being would help him find a way to make our preontological understanding of Being explicit. In his later works he continued to struggle with the same basic problem but approached the question from the viewpoint of the different forms, or "expressions," in which Being manifests itself in the various epochs of Being's own history. . . . This "turn" in Heidegger's approach to the main problem took place between 1929 and 1935.¹⁹

A major place where scholars often situate this earlier "ontological turn" is in *The Essence of Reasons* when Heidegger discusses transcendence as *Überstieg*. "Im Überstieg kommt das Dasein allererst auf solches Seiendes zu, das *es* ist, auf es als es 'selbst.' Die Transzendenz konstituiert die Selbstheit" ("In surpassing, Dasein first attains to the being that *it* is; what it attains to is its 'self.' Transcendence constitutes selfhood").²⁰ *Überstieg* is "undecidable" and Maurice Blanchot therefore re-names it *le pas au-delà*: the step (not) beyond. When Heidegger says "transcendence constitutes selfhood," he is not saying anything that would be compatible with mystics, American transcendentalists, or the like. For Heidegger views transcendence as an inhabiting of ontological difference through which the categories of metaphysics are violently demolished. The "difference" between being and Being is incapacitated in the very

moment it prevails as a means through which the turn from being to Being is made.

But Heidegger himself seems to have abandoned this “turn,” for in *An Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger had transposed the work on transcendence into a discourse about the language of metaphysics—polemos—which comprised an ab-original conflict wherein differences were affirmed even as the binding together that is *logos* was achieved. “It is this conflict that first projects and develops what had hitherto been unheard of, unsaid and unthought.”²¹ This “projection” of polemos is itself a transposition of the notion of transcendence as ontological difference into a linguistic context, a close examination of ancient Greek etymologies. Yet, is it here that the temporal clue mentioned at the outset of *Being and Time* would be discovered? Not judging from the end of *An Introduction*, where the time problematic is just as nascent and undeveloped as in many of the previous works. Thus once more the adequacy of the turn noticed by Heidegger scholars is enough in doubt to disqualify the notion that a turn has, indeed, been taken rather than merely announced.

Thomas Sheehan, in taking issue with many of the prevalent views about what constitutes Heidegger’s turn, thinks that such a turn was in fact made in the early work of Heidegger and that it was explicitly worked out in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, which comprises lecture notes from 1928, only a year after *Being and Time* was published. At that time Heidegger wrote: “The temporal analysis is at the same time the turning-around [*Kehre*], where ontology itself expressly runs back into the metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains. Through the movement of radicalizing and universalizing, the aim is to bring ontology to its latent overturning [*Umschlag*]. Here the turn-around [*Kehre*] is carried out, and it is turned over into the metontology.”²² Although Sheehan insists this is the place where the turn occurs, he recognizes it occurring, too, in *Being and Time* and, less convincingly, in Heidegger’s thinking of the early 1920s. But certainly, it does not take much imagination to uncover it also in the design cited above in *Being and Time*, where the two fundamental moments of Heidegger’s analysis are announced, the one constituting a turn with respect to the other.

The turn, then, inherently divides, parcels out, or iterates throughout much of Heidegger's corpus and works against finite distinctions that might separate an earlier from a later Heidegger. Hence, it "overturns" the usual chronological sense we have of the development of intellectual thought and deconstitutes what scholars would like to reduce to the history of Heideggerian thinking. Moreover, the turn becomes an iterated problematic always raising the issue of whether Heidegger's initial itinerary in *Being and Time* is ever satisfied, as if to say that the questions regarding Being and time must necessarily be posed from the vantage point of an aporia whose assertion and repetition may be offered the chance of being surpassed even as it is reinstated.

Indeed, although my project is not conceived primarily to evaluate Heidegger's successes or failures with respect to fulfilling the turn(s), I have come to the conclusion that these moments in Heidegger's work disclose a *metaleptic* or paronomasic movement (a going beyond even as one stays in the same place) that reveals a modality of time or history which radically resituates not only how we are to comprehend Heidegger but how we are to evaluate the "correspondences" of his various philosophical moments. To my knowledge, Derrida's writings on Heidegger are the only interpretations which respect this deconstitution of a teleological intellectual history of self-enclosed moments within the trajectory of philosophical meditation. And precisely when Derrida addresses issues of temporality which bear on Heideggerian thinking, we begin to realize exactly how radical Heideggerian thought is from the perspective of a historical sedimentation which works against the familiar notions of chronological development or historization.

Derrida's Turning the Turns

Of course, Derrida, like other readers of Heidegger, has been interested in the extent to which even in the iteration of a turn that turn is actually made. Although it might be reductive to assume, as some Heidegger scholars do, that the turn either occurs at one go or not, it remains an issue whether a particular turn will be made at all, a turn which would take us

from part 1 to part 2 of the itinerary of *Being and Time*. The passage above from *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* certainly reformulates the “design” of Heideggerian analysis as metaphor, the turning or overturning. Yet the question is whether this turn is actually made in such lecture notes as *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, or *History of the Concept of Time*. As we have noticed, Heidegger scholars debate the issue of the turn at every turn, and Derrida has asked this question with respect to a footnote in *Being and Time*, suggesting that such a turn is hardly achieved or even adequately addressed. As I will corroborate in a brief overview of the background lectures and notes surrounding the publication of *Being and Time*, Derrida’s intuition derived from a reading of a footnote in Heidegger is quite correct. Yet, although the announced turn is not fulfilled during the 1930s, a “linguistic turn” later becomes noticeable, for example, in “The Letter on Humanism” of the mid-1940s. At various points in the letter, Heidegger glosses *Being and Time*. At one point he quotes himself as having written, “The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence.” The subject of this sentence from *Being and Time* is clearly the essence of Dasein, which is to say, Dasein itself. But in “The Letter” Heidegger rereads this sentence in order to make a turn emphasizing existence. “The ‘Being’ of the *Da*, and only it, has the fundamental character of ek-sistence, that is, of an ecstatic inherence in the truth of Being.”²³ It has become commonplace for Heideggerians to situate the famous turn at this juncture in which emphasis from the perspective of Dasein gives way to emphasis on the perspectives offered from Being. However, in “The Letter” Heidegger says, “language is the house of Being,” and instead of providing an analysis of existential phenomena, such as the moods, which occurred in the earlier *Being and Time* as an accompaniment to the analysis of Dasein, he now turns to the question of language. This turn is reflected in the French structuralist overturning of Sartrean existentialism for the sake of an inquiry into practices of signification, and Derrida himself makes this turn in *Of Grammatology* when he discusses Heidegger within Saussurean contexts. Less obviously, however, the hint occurs that in the turn to language, the earlier turn predicted in the design of *Being and Time* is also brought

toward completion, and this, of course, concerns temporality as a radical clue through which the history (chronology, temporality) of Western ontology is deconstituted or, as Derrida would have it, deconstructed. This is a “turn” which has not been generally recognized and without which one cannot adequately understand Derrida’s own corpus of books and essays which begin reperforming the Heideggerian “turn” by the mid-1970s. Whereas the essays on Heidegger written during the late 1960s appreciate Heidegger’s notions of “ontological difference” about which so much had been worked through by the Heideggerians themselves, it appears that the temporal turn through language made by Heidegger is not fully appreciated by Derrida until he comes to a reading of Maurice Blanchot who, I feel, has been an enormous influence in developing the implications of the linguistic turn noted in Heidegger’s “Letter.” In fact, the performance of this “turn” comprises Blanchot’s literary achievements.

In “The Turning” (1950) of Heidegger, however, a later phase of Derrida’s consideration of the handling of time in Heidegger is raised as a “correspondence.” Here the linguistic turn of the 1940s gives way to an even sharper turn which Heidegger makes after his consideration of philosophy from the perspective of the truth of Being. This turn develops the notion of *Ereignis* or the appropriative-event-of-disclosure, wherein an event comes to be seen as a manifold in which various moments correspond. In the small essay “Zeit und Sein,” Heidegger develops the notion of *Ereignis* at length, and it culminates in the very radical disarticulation of a temporality as we experience it in our day-to-day affairs. Of major importance in “Zeit und Sein” is the idea that Being is sent through an “event” whose moments both appropriate and expropriate “correspondences” so that in the arrival of Being there is what Heidegger calls a “turning away” from the truth of Being, a moment, in other words, in which Being is subjected to “demolition” or “destruction.” Certainly, the turn announced at the beginning of *Being and Time* is brought very much to pass in the “correspondence” of “The Turning” to “Zeit und Sein.”

For Derrida the realization of this turn influences both *The Post Card*, written in the late 1970s, and what amounts to an important turn in Derrida’s own writing, “Of an Apocalyptic

Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy,” which appeared in the early 1980s. In *The Post Card* Derrida literalizes Heidegger’s notion of “correspondence” as the postal system’s technology, and he considers the “sending of Being” in the sense of an *envoi* or “dispatch” which is part of an “event” disclosing extremely radical notions about temporality. Here the “linguistic turn” in Derrida’s *Of Grammatology* is carried over into a performative writing—that is, the letters—wherein the even later “turnings” of Heidegger are inscribed as correspondence, technology, dispatch, relay, and postcard. The “correspondences” of Derrida, then, consider language as the medium wherein *Ereignis* is at once articulated and subverted; however, this is also where Derrida makes his own peculiar turn back to an existential position, since the “letters” Derrida writes are autobiographical, personal effects of the life of the writer.

This “turn” in Derrida is accompanied by an even stranger one, perhaps, which is the turn from ontology to theology. Already in *The Post Card* Derrida is thinking about the history of metaphysics or ontology from the later Heideggerian perspective and then translates it into religious or sacred history—for example, the meditation on the *Book of Esther* in the Old Testament. In “Of an Apocalyptic Tone” Derrida again thinks about dispatches, though as a dispatch from God to St. John the Divine and St. John’s dispatches to the seven churches of Asia from Patmos. We recall that in “The Turning” Heidegger talks about the turn away from truth as well as the oblivion of Being that occurs in its coming to pass. Derrida’s “dispatch” concerns “oblivion” or “demolition” as the “destiny” of the “sending of Being,” a destiny disclosed in an “end” or manifestation of the oblivion of Being: the catastrophe called technology wherein the dangerous turn of Being is disclosed in modern history. This end is apocalyptic, as Derrida indicates, and in it there is made yet another turn which is specifically Derrida’s: the turn from Christianity to Judaism by way of a reexamination of the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. We recall that in Levinas the “end” is thought from the “beyond” of Being, from the “end of the end of the end,” which is to say, from the forestalling of apocalypse, its demolition, in its very arrival.²⁴ Indeed, by way of Levinas, Derrida will demonstrate that even the later and most radical turns of Heidegger prove to

be inadequate, as not radical enough, since in the “event” that is the catastrophe or apocalypse something is held back, not given, *en retrait*.

Outline

The first four chapters of my study correspond to crucial Heideggerian “turns,” and in the fifth chapter I consider the “time of the thesis.” In chapter 1 I focus on a turn which occurs in Heidegger’s “The Anaximander Fragment” from *Holzwege* that is crucial for understanding some of the continuities in the relation between deconstruction and Heideggerian philosophy. After a very brief introduction, I begin with remarks on Derrida’s reading of “The Anaximander Fragment” in “Ousia et grammè,” wherein we have perhaps one of the clearest examples of deconstruction’s direct filiation to a passage in Heidegger whose ostensible subject is temporality. That the “attachment” is made very fleetingly in the essay, and that it occurs as a reading that largely ignores a close reading of Heidegger’s essay, not to mention Anaximander’s consideration of temporality, is particularly interesting, since, as I show, “The Anaximander Fragment” has more than a few characteristics bearing on the time question that anticipate much of what has been considered to be innovative in the deconstructive method. Throughout this chapter I emphasize the bearing of Heidegger’s work on Derrida even when in Derrida’s tactical disregard of Heidegger we see a performative imitation by Derrida occurring: that of recollection as strategic forgetting.

In chapter 2 I stress the dissimilarities between Heideggerian philosophy and deconstruction, starting with a close examination of the turn from Being to time missed in the early part of Heidegger’s career. I demonstrate that the early career is very problematic because Heidegger had been writing several versions of *Being and Time* simultaneously and that these versions are not exactly interchangeable. The turn, therefore, is and is not being made simultaneously in a number of tracts. However, when Derrida criticizes a footnote in *Being and Time* in such a way that he exposes Heidegger’s inability to make the

turn outlined in the second part of the design in *Being and Time*, I show that, in fact, given the Heidegger materials published after Derrida's "Ousia et grammè" the intuitions of Derrida are, indeed, upheld. Still, given the enormous amount of writing that Heidegger had undertaken during the period, we will see that here, again, determining the status of Heidegger's project is a very complex issue which, quite evidently, exceeds the bounds of my study, though its most important consequence can already be glimpsed: a textual performance that prefigures the more radical notions of temporality of the 1950s. Also, this chapter provides a historical outline of some of Heidegger's positions on temporality during the early period, which are explained and put into correspondence with deconstruction.

In chapter 3 I consider the relation between language and temporality from the perspective of the famous Heideggerian linguistic turn announced in "The Letter on Humanism," but which is also reflected in the seminar *Heraklit*, a seminar given during the war years. In introducing Derrida's essays on Heidegger from the mid-1970s, I focus on Maurice Blanchot who, I feel, was very influential for Derrida during this time, and particularly with respect to reading Heidegger. In part I analyze a chapter from *La part du feu* in order to show that Blanchot, writing before "The Letter on Humanism" was published, clearly foresaw the famous turn in the "Letter" from having read Heidegger's work on Hölderlin. Part of my argument in this chapter is that Blanchot already saw that Heidegger had made the turn from an ontological to a temporal analytic through a consideration of language as metalepsis. That Derrida seems to have been influenced rather late by this view is reflected in "Pas." My claim is that whereas Derrida had estranged deconstruction from Heideggerian thinking in the late 1960s, there is in texts like "Pas" a rapprochement with a rhetoric of proximity that earlier had been dismissed. In chapter 3 I also discuss Derrida's "The Retrait of Metaphor" and "Restitutions." I conclude with an analysis of *De l'esprit* (1987), wherein metalepsis again plays an important role, particularly insofar as *l'esprit* is considered as a parceling out of terms that cannot be considered apart from the question of temporaliza-

tion. In *De l'esprit*, however, one notices a decided if not hostile turning away from Heidegger in the 1980s, which will be investigated at greater length in the chapter that follows.

In chapter 4 I consider Heidegger's announced turn in his writings on technology during the 1950s in relation to Derrida's *The Post Card*, wherein the technology of the post office has very strong analogues with the late Heidegger. A key term in the chapter is "correspondence," a Heideggerian notion that is literalized by Derrida as meaning "dispatch" or "missive." In Heidegger's later work "correspondence" refers to a gathering together of words wherein a temporality takes place that is far more radical than any Heidegger had considered earlier in his career, a temporality associated with the term *Ereignis*. I also consider Derrida's "Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy" and discuss how in the 1980s there is not only a turning to Heidegger and an acknowledgment of his very radical notion of temporality which developed in his late career but also a turning away from Heidegger, which is signaled by an interest in the temporality of Christian apocalypse and its relationship to Jewish religion. In this context I am particularly interested in Derrida's turning away from Heidegger and toward the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, who has considered temporality at length with respect to the question of Being. That Derrida is considering a Jewish philosopher and engaging religious history even while allowing his texts to resonate with Heideggerian concerns raises a number of interesting problems which surface much more strongly in the essay "Two Words for Joyce," the recent "Geschlecht" articles, and the short book *Shibboleth*. In these writings one can detect an antipathy between Jewish and German thinking which comes to the fore, something that has already appeared in very disturbing ways in Derrida's *Glas* with respect to the notion of the intercolumn as "Judas" and in the anti-Semitic passage by Jean Paul wherein Derrida weaves the notion of philosopher as traitor or one who turns away from. This is not meant to suggest that Derrida is finally taking an absolute distance from Heidegger but that he reinscribes deconstruction's turning to and away from Heidegger within historical or temporal contexts that again harass the decidability of an intellectual history

that might strive for a fixed distance between Heidegger and Derrida.

Chapter 5 concludes this book with remarks on the time of the thesis in order to underscore a deconstructive philosophy on the taking of intellectual positions. I argue that position taking is inextricably bound with the strictures of temporality and that this undermines the sorts of comparative analyses best exemplified in the work of Jürgen Habermas, who is himself very familiar with philosophical backgrounds and attentive to the question of temporality pertaining to Derrida and Heidegger. That the question of temporality has to be grasped in terms of its own historical unfolding as a taking time with time is a point that intellectual historicizing easily elides.

ONE

TRANSLATING

THE ASSESSMENTS

OF TIME

Derrida has been extremely concerned with grounding his philosophical project within intellectual history, and his thought is meant to be a continuation of ideas, however much they may be modified, of thinkers like Aristotle, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger. Indeed, Derrida's patient and meticulous readings of philosophy are also meant to push further conceptual relationships which threaten to fracture a text's continuity or totalizing claims. *Parergon* in Kant, *Aufhebung* in Hegel, and *Spur* in Heidegger are deconstructive terms which expose those places where texts fissure. Such fault lines indicate a division where the logic of philosophical tradition is itself at stake, because such traditional logical claims are indebted to a metaphysical philosophy which has its sources in Plato and Aristotle. However, if Derrida wishes to break with this tradition, he still wants to claim legitimacy as one of the most important contemporary heirs of philosophy.

In her introduction to *Dissemination*, Barbara Johnson has written that "deconstruction is a form of what has long been called a *critique*." She defines critique as a discourse which "focuses on the grounds of [a] system's possibility." And she adds, "The critique reads backwards from what seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal in order to show that these things have their history, their reasons for being the way they are, their effects on what follows from them, and that the starting point is not a [natural] given but a [cultural] construct,

usually blind to itself.”¹ Johnson’s reading of deconstruction presupposes the traditional assumption that ideas have “their history” and “reasons for being the way they are” and that ideas have effects on “what follows from them.” This view supports the claim that deconstruction is part of a continuous intellectual history. Derrida himself makes this point when he writes: “This moment of doubling commentary should no doubt have its place in a critical reading. To recognize and respect all its classical exigencies is not easy and requires all the instruments of traditional criticism.”² Derrida corroborates Johnson’s perception that deconstruction is a critical method within the philosophical tradition, and Derrida also comments, “Without this recognition and this respect, critical production would risk developing in any direction at all and authorize itself to say almost anything.”³

This chapter begins with an analysis of Derrida’s writings of the late 1960s, largely from the viewpoint of those features which either explicitly or implicitly presuppose continuities with Heidegger’s philosophy. My intention is not to develop an account that suffers from *clôture*, though I would not like to lose sight altogether of a developing and consistent argument. My approach throughout this book is to work through a number of *parages*, or latitudes, wherein texts are positioned and repositioned along the lines of their turning toward and away from one another. That is, I am concerned with the “correspondences” of philosophical texts as part of an open structure wherein affinities and resistances are dynamically situated and resituated. The main readings by Derrida which concern me in this chapter are “Ousia et grammè,” “La différance,” and “The White Mythology.” In “Ousia et grammè” and “La différance” it is more than hinted that Heidegger had failed to make a “turn” from Being to time in his earlier treatises and that this failure can again be detected in Heidegger’s works of the 1940s. However, Derrida also suggests much more marginally that Heidegger to the contrary also succeeded in dismantling the ontological grounds wherein the proposed turn to time could take place. What I first wish to develop, therefore, are the remarks by Derrida himself which situate philosophical features of deconstruction in continuity with the more radical aspects of Heideggerian thought.

The Difference of Difference

In “Ousia et grammè” Derrida considers not only Heidegger’s resistance to deconstructing the history of ontology but discloses how Heidegger also outlines a “temporal clue” with the potential of deconstructing the question of Being as presencing. Derrida’s specific intervention in Heidegger touches on “The Anaximander Fragment” and addresses Heidegger’s phrase “Lichtung des Unterschiedes” (illumination of difference). The crucial moment in Derrida’s analysis occurs when Derrida first attempts to surpass Heidegger’s metaphysical constraints, a moment when in articulating the interplay of differences in which metaphysics is suspended, Heidegger upholds and annihilates metaphysics in the same breath. Heidegger writes:

However, the distinction between Being and beings, as something forgotten, can invade our experience only if it has already unveiled itself with the presencing of what is present; only if it has left a trace which remains preserved in the language to which Being comes. Thinking along those lines, we may surmise that the distinction has been illuminated more in that early word about Being than in recent ones; yet at no time has the distinction been designated as such. Illumination of the distinction therefore cannot mean that the distinction appears as a distinction. On the contrary, the relation to what is present in presencing as such may announce itself in such a way that presencing comes to speak *as this relation*.

[Der Unterschied des Seins zum Seienden kann jedoch nur dann als ein vergessener in eine Erfahrung kommen, wenn er sich schon mit dem Anwesen des Anwesenden enthüllt und so eine Spur geprägt hat, die in der Sprache, zu der das Sein kommt, gewahrt bleibt. So denkend, dürfen wir vermuten, dass eher im frühen Wort des Seins als in den späteren der Unterschied sich gelichtet hat, ohne doch jemals als ein solcher genannt zu sein. Lichtung des Unterschiedes kann deshalb auch nicht bedeuten, dass der Unterschied als der Unterschied erscheint. Wohl dagegen mag sich im Anwesen als sol-

chem die Beziehung auf das Anwesende bekunden, so zwar, dass das Anwesen *als diese Beziehung* zu Wort kommt.]⁴

The recovery of the distinction presencing/present is that which takes place only by attention to the trace of the distinction which has been obliterated when presencing appears as something present. In the oblivion of such a distinction Being achieves its destiny and not merely as lack but as a rich and prodigious event. "In it the history of the Western world comes to be borne out. It is the event of metaphysics."⁵

In discussing the passage on *Unterschied*, Derrida stresses the term "trace," or *Spur*, and in exaggerating it can accentuate difference and downplay the question of presence, Heidegger's main concern. Some sentences from "Ousia et grammè" readily show this change of emphasis: "Presence, then, far from being, as is commonly thought, *what* the sign signifies, what a trace refers to, presence, then, is the trace of the trace, the trace of the erasure of the trace." Or, "The trace of the trace which (is) difference above all could not appear or be named *as such*, that is, in its presence." Having paraphrased Heidegger by means of unconcealing the wearing and tearing of traces, Derrida adds, "The determinations which name difference always come from the metaphysical order."⁶ Derrida means that just because the trace which is difference (the "is" being understood as under erasure) cannot appear or be *as such*, cannot make itself appear or be present in its presencings, this does not mean the determinations or inclinations which delimit the name difference are any less metaphysical. Having ascertained that Heidegger's tracings are all too metaphysical, no matter how purified of metaphysical categorizations, Derrida makes the step "beyond" Heidegger: "Beyond Being and beings, this difference, ceaselessly differing from and deferring (itself), would trace (itself) (by itself)—this *differance* would be the first or last trace if one could still speak, here, of origin and end."⁷ Derrida's insight is to have recognized in the interplay of Heideggerian differences an *excess* which ruptures a metaphysical economy of terms. The excess of differences goes beyond the oppositions of presence and absence, emergence and decline, origin and end. Since the difference ceaselessly differs and defers, estranging and estab-

lishing itself within and without itself, we must acknowledge difference as the “effect” of Being and beings and also as something more primary, the first and last trace, if one could speak of origin and end. The difference of difference, then, supports and undermines mimetic recovery as that which is re-presented. In this sense Derrida realizes that Heidegger’s passage points to a way beyond the metaphysics of representation. For the differences differ without cease, trace themselves by way of simulacra which make undecidable the proximity of difference to identity.

This is the extent, then, in Derrida’s “Ousia et grammè” of the critical reading which “requires all the instruments of traditional criticism” for the sake of tracing a filiation between one body of thought and another. In Derrida’s incisive and brief reading of Heidegger we see the point where “la différance” is located as an essential feature of an essay in *Holzwege*. This reading will be repeated at the end of an essay, entitled “La différance,” where Heidegger’s essay on Anaximander is oddly subordinated like a footnote to the very sophisticated theory of undecidability. Leaving for much later our reading of “La différance” and the questions it resolves, we want to know what accounts for the brevity of this auspicious moment in “Ousia et grammè” and the cursory reading of Heidegger’s text “The Anaximander Fragment.”

Curiously enough, although “The Anaximander Fragment” directly engages many issues extremely pertinent to Derrida’s writings, Derrida, in large part, fails to address these matters in precisely that essay where he clearly delimits the filiation of deconstruction to Heideggerian thought. We have noticed that Derrida has selected only that place in “The Anaximander Fragment” where the question of ontological difference is raised in terms of the trace, implying that Heidegger’s discourse broaches a most radically antimetaphysical perspective even as Heidegger is resisting this by means of dwelling on the question of presence. Derrida, in short, reperforms the Heideggerian text and in so doing exposes the radical temporal clue, “différance,” which remained concealed to Heidegger. But this reperformance of Heidegger comes at the expense of a general interpretation of “The Anaximander Fragment,” which, if undertaken, would almost certainly weaken Derrida’s

thesis that Heidegger remains only on the threshold of deconstruction, that it is Derrida who is entitled to lay claim to being the founder of deconstruction, something he maintains in *The Post Card* when he defensively attacks those Heideggerians who translate *Abbauen* as *déconstruire*, as if intellectual history can be reversed.

Time as Translation

In “The Anaximander Fragment” Heidegger discusses the translation and translatability of a pre-Socratic fragment whose original is lost but whose text is paraphrased as well as quoted by Plutarch, Hippolytus, and Simplicius, quotations or commentaries in themselves indebted to a lost paraphrase and quotation of Anaximander by Theophrastus. That the Anaximander passage concerns the origination and destruction of things according to necessity makes Heidegger’s use of the passage quite intriguing with respect to the question of translation in which necessity involves both the question of origin or originality and of belatedness, secondariness, and destructiveness. Moreover, the issue of translation also suits Heidegger’s aim of demonstrating how Being is disclosed as a network of supplementary marks whose original cannot be recovered but which has withdrawn and become concealed. Heidegger’s interest presupposes an idea expressed elsewhere in *Holzwege*, the collection in which “The Anaximander Fragment” is contained, that through the destruction of works we intuit the unconcealment and concealment of Being. The Anaximander fragment, not unlike the ruins of a Greek temple discussed in Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art,” is a formation whose original relatedness to Being is unrecoverable though its traces can be detected through reflection on what the fragment of the work has meant throughout history or the assessments of time by means of which it is translated.⁸

Heidegger is well aware that he enters late into the history of paraphrases on the Anaximander fragment, and he cites Nietzsche and Hermann Diels, whose translations are, of course, interpretations or paraphrases in themselves. Heidegger therefore asks: “Can the Anaximander fragment, from a historical

and chronological distance of two thousand five hundred years, still say something to us? By what authority should it speak?" Heidegger's question is not meant to be dramatic but addresses Anaximander's premonition of a destruction related to the question of temporality: "Do we stand in the very twilight of the most monstrous transformation our planet has ever undergone, the twilight of that epoch in which earth itself hangs suspended? Do we confront the evening of a night which heralds another dawn? Are we to strike off on a journey to this historic region of earth's evening?"⁹ Anaximander's fragment, "the oldest vouchsafed to us by our tradition," is at once about origin and, according to the assessments of time, about the end, the end of philosophy and of the Occident. The fragment and its ontological and temporal references become, for Heidegger, a clue which "systematically destroys the future and our historic relation to the advent of destiny."¹⁰ However, this systematizing is not rational in an Enlightenment sense; rather, it is a systematizing of the wearing of translations, of the trace-work of one text upon another, the retraction and protraction of the meaning of being as relayed through a network of trans-ferential inscriptions. In this sense, then, Heidegger broaches a notion of *écriture* similar to that which Derrida advances in the 1960s. Yet, in "Ousia et grammè" Derrida ignores Heidegger's "The Anaximander Fragment" in this context. Instead, he focuses only on that passage in which Heidegger is discussing the clarification of difference, or "Lichtung des Unterschiedes."

Of course, the passage Heidegger reads is divided or disseminative insofar as one has to read Simplicius, Hippolytus, and Plutarch side by side and then opt for various translations of them into modern languages. And Heidegger is extremely sensitive to the fact that the text he reads is not univocal, that it is at best residual, polyvalent, and perhaps even unreliable. Intuitively Heidegger is drawn to the text of Simplicius and after Nietzsche's translation cites the translation of Diels.

The beginning and origin of existing things is the *Ap-
eiron* (the limitless-undetermined). Out of which, how-
ever, becoming relates to existing things even though it
also transpires in what lies beyond; passing into obliga-
tion, for they pay just penalty and retribution to each

other for their injustice according to the disposition of Time.

[Anfang und Ursprung der seienden Dinge ist das Ap-
eiron (das grenzenlos-Unbestimmbare). Woraus aber das
Werden ist den seienden Dingen, in das hinein geschieht
auch ihr. Vergehen nach der Schuldigkeit; denn sie
zahlen einander gerechte Strafe und Busse für ihre Un-
gerechtigkeit nach der Zeit Anordnung.]¹¹

Heidegger's own translation follows.

along the lines of usage; for they let order and thereby
also reck belong to one another (in the surmounting) of
disorder.

[entlang dem Brauch; gehören nämlich lassen sie Fug
somit auch Ruch eines dem anderen (im Verwinden) des
Un-Fugs.]¹²

In large part, "The Anaximander Fragment" is both a justification of Heidegger's translation and a means to develop thoughts on being which are precategorical and therefore not bound to concepts which are part of a metaphysics as developed by Plato and Aristotle. This is why Heidegger's translation deviates so much from those of his precursors. However, Heidegger's essay on Anaximander is also concerned with the question of time, and Heidegger's important contribution to the scholarship on the Anaximander fragment is precisely the idea that trans-cription and trans-lation are key to the uncovering of a radical temporal clue by means of which the history of ontology is dismantled as a continuous and coherent flow of events which are appropriable as something that is whole, revealed, rational. Most significant is the fact that "The Anaximander Fragment" does not discuss transcription so much as it *performs* transcription within the interpretive process of revision and rewriting. Indeed, for Heidegger the destiny of philosophy is the process of a trans-lation or trans-cription which must yield to the revelations and concealments of the assessments of time that inheres in the making present of that which was given at the beginning of thought. Heidegger's meticulous readings of Anaximander's words are not so much a philologi-

cal exercise but the performance of a sentence's transcription. Itself a fragment, the sentence reveals the beginnings of philosophy as always already belated, not to mention as prophetically describing the wear and tear of words which act upon the fragment through time by way of transcribing the transcriptions, or of translating the translations. For Heidegger, as is well known, the tracks or traces which translation leaves historically recall the beginnings of philosophy. In fact, the meaning of Being is conveyed through time as error, that is to say, as those deflections which make up the abrasion and destiny of Being. This is the effect of transcription, of writing, and Heidegger writes, "Without errancy there would be no connection from destiny to destiny: there would be no history."¹³

In the context of the Greek paraphrases of Anaximander, errancy and abrasion are terms well established in the word *phthora*, which Heidegger defines in an abstract way when he writes: "*Phthora* means the departure and descent into concealment of what has arrived there out of unconcealment. The coming forward into . . . and the departure to . . . *become present* within unconcealment between what is concealed and what is unconcealed. They initiate the arrival and departure of whatever has arrived."¹⁴ *Phthora* is intimately related to genesis in Anaximander, since, as Heidegger says, the difference between creation and destruction is unbounded, a point Heidegger makes once more in "Over 'The Line'" when he explains the role of language in terms of nihilism: "The position of nihilism has, so it seems, already been given up in a certain way by the crossing of the line, but *its language has remained*."¹⁵ Language, or *Sprache*, is subjected to the erasures and crossings of the limits that demarcate "ontological differences." It moves over the line between existence and oblivion, though its "language," or jargon, remains behind, resisting or forestalling the totality of a crossing beyond, in the sense of a lag or residue. In its very evocation, disorder is brought into line, is given order. In "The Anaximander Fragment," *phthora* is read in terms of Heidegger's translation, "along the lines of usage." For *phthora* is the wearing and tearing, or destruction, which accompanies the founding, genesis, creation, or production. "For they let order and thereby also reck belong to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder." This sentence from Anaximander,

translated by Heidegger, is, of course, an implicit gloss on the familiar translation, "according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution for each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time." *Phthora*, here, concerns the reck (Heidegger's term is *ruch*) through which disorder is surmounted, what one might call the unconcealment of nihilism, but not as an antithesis to being through which the belonging of order/disorder is disclosed so much as that which comprises being even in the moment of its erasure. For Heidegger what constitutes being as that wherein being is destined is itself the Anaximander fragment which is sent through its *phthora*, or reck, as language. Through this abrasion language as thought continues, the fragment survives, disorder is surmounted. This is what the more familiar translation of Anaximander calls "according to necessity" and what Heidegger wishes to consider "according to the lines of usage."

Heidegger's focus is largely upon the undialectical relationship of order/disorder, a relation which the more familiar translation presents as the question of "retribution" occurring according to the "assessments of Time." *Phthora*, like the term *usure* in French, involves paying back and not just abrasion. It is as if the fragment of philosophy has had to pay the penalty of being kept alive through the assessments that time as history makes upon it. Indeed, is such fragmentation evidence that penalty has been paid, that the majority of Anaximander's text has been taxed and forfeited? Heidegger's reading reflects how the forfeits of time mark a continuation and even a revelation of the text, as if only because of a treatise's fragmentation through time, we come to see those aspects of its relationship to Being that would remain concealed were it not for time's reck.

Yet, such a reading depends not merely upon the fragmentation of philosophy but upon its pluralization: the counterpointing of translations. Certainly fragmentation is accompanied by the dissemination of error, the proliferation of translations or transcriptions. Philosophy is not a return to any arche so much as it is a historical performance unconcealing relations to Being which in Heidegger's earlier works were subsumed under the term "Dasein." Interpretation far from being authorized by any origin is always parasitical, unsituated,

the performance of the conflict of translations, each of which is inherently supplementary. It may not be accidental that Heidegger emphasizes *phthora*, since it discloses parasitism not only in the sense of abrasion but in its affinity with *phtheir*, which means louse or parasite.¹⁶ At this point one could develop an interpretation of “The Anaximander Fragment” by way of Michel Serres’s *The Parasite*, a study investigating information theory from the perspective of parasitical interruptions. But let me say in lieu of a lengthy digression on Serres that as far as modern classical scholarship is concerned, Heidegger’s reading of Anaximander is at best para-sitical, a reading not taken as serious scholarship on Anaximander but understood as adopting Anaximander in order to advance preconceptions worked out prior to investigating the Greeks. Heidegger is often considered, then, as one who merely uses figures like Anaximander as hosts for a refined critique of ontology that the pre-Socratics themselves would not have recognized. And yet, Heidegger appears quite aware that such parasitism is always the condition under which any ancient text is to be received as transcribed or translated. It is a question of the destiny of the letter, the destiny of writing, a destiny infiltrated by parasites who facilitate *phthora*.

In answering the question What is philosophy? Heidegger writes:

This path to the answer to our question is not a break with history, no repudiation of history, but is an adoption and transformation of what has been handed down to us. Such an adoption of history is what is meant by the term “destruction” (“*Destruktion*”). The meaning of this word has been clearly described in *Being and Time*. Destruction does not mean destroying (*bedeutet nicht Zerstören*) but dismantling, liquidating, putting to one side (*sondern Abbauen, Abtragen und Auf-die Seite-stellen*) the merely historical assertions about the history of philosophy.

Destruction means—to open our ears, to make ourselves free for what speaks to us in tradition as the Being of being (*Sein des Seienden*). By listening to this interpellation we attain the correspondence (*Entsprechung*).¹⁷

Translation and transcription are modalities of this destruction, a destruction or breaking up which allows one to pursue a path toward the bearing of a relationship of Being to being. In the transformation of what comes down to us, in its disturbance, we become capable of opening our ears to what is concealed in the legacy. It is in the destruction—what Derrida later will call deconstruction—of the handed down that a certain tuning and correspondence can take place. The philosopher is a parasite or interrupter of the “handed down,” a destroyer of continuities, and yet this philosopher does not “break with history” or dismiss it.

Derrida’s own historical attitudes are not distant from Heidegger’s, a point acknowledged in *Positions*.

Must I recall that from the first texts I published I have attempted to systematize a deconstructive critique precisely against the authority of meaning, as the *transcendental signified* or as *telos*, in other words history determined in the last analysis as the history of meaning, history in its logocentric, metaphysical, idealist [. . .] representation, even up to the complex marks it has left in Heidegger’s discourse?¹⁸

And in *Of Grammatology*, he has written:

A historico-metaphysical epoch *must* finally determine as language the totality of its problematic horizon. It must do so not only because all that desire had wished to wrest from the play of language finds itself recaptured within that play but also because, for the same reason, language itself is menaced in its very life, helpless, adrift in the threat of limitlessness, brought back to its own finitude at the very moment when its limits seem to disappear, when it ceases to be self-assured, contained, and *guaranteed* by the infinite signified which seemed to exceed it.¹⁹

Derrida recognizes, in following Heidegger, that no philosophical or literary text can simply step outside of a historico-metaphysical framework, since language will be brought back to its own finitude at the point when its boundaries or limits

are worn and torn away. Destruction or deconstruction are not in themselves terms which prophesy the “end” of a historico-metaphysical temporal structure, a going beyond metaphysics, but terms which address the destiny of thought which through translation and reinscription allows us to consider and even perform those textual enactments of menacing limits whose effect is to counter the premises upon which an authority of the self-givenness of meaning is established. In terms of Anaximander this threat to the self-givenness of meaning ought to be considered as the assessments of time, revealed through the handing down of thought as reinscription. And through this reinscription the limits of thought are menaced even as in the delimitation of thought metaphysical recovery takes place. Derrida’s interpretation of Heidegger’s “The Anaximander Fragment” is quite clearly such a reinscription, and one that reveals the stress of translation. As *phthora* it necessarily takes place as *phtheira*, which is to say, in the place of an other’s words.

And this is the fate of criticism which deconstruction would like to elude. Deconstruction in taking the form of what Barbara Johnson calls a “critique” still wants to elude its taking place in an other’s words even as it depends upon them. But how does deconstruction go back to the place of the other’s words without simply being subsumed under the genre of critique? Rodolphe Gasché in *The Tain of the Mirror* mentions that in Heidegger there is already a *Schritt zurück*, or “step back,” which comprises “a return to a beginning . . . a beginning that never occurred as such, and that is the realm, ‘which until now has been skipped over,’ of the essence of metaphysics, which comes into view only by means of retrogression.” Such a retrogression is a reflective movement that allows the “ontico-ontological difference, or the question of Being—[to] appear face to face with thought.”²⁰ Hence in “The Anaximander Fragment” retrogression is under way in Heidegger’s taking the translation of Anaximander a step forward, as if to go ahead is to go back. But such a taking place in an other’s language is never anything else than a question of translation whose resistance to the language of an other is itself where the ontico-ontological difference is manifest as *écriture* (philosophy).

Heidegger’s essay goes back to Anaximander only by going

forward as a translation that resists taking place in the language of an other. This suggests, then, that for Heidegger recollection is a steadfast refusal to go back *critically* in the sense that Barbara Johnson uses the term. Rather, recollection occurs in the meditation on how an ancient philosophical fragment has been worn and torn, on how recollection or retrospection is itself an effect of the sending of this fragment through time by means of metaleptic transference (i.e., translation), wherein the language of an other is both welcomed and resisted. What Heidegger stringently avoids is that his text take place in the place of Anaximander's fragment as if that fragment could be recovered and remembered as anything other than the *phthora* of its destining. And to that extent Heidegger takes his distance from critique which assumes the recovery Heidegger denies.

In Derrida's "translation" of Heidegger, reflection as retrogression occurs not in spite of but because of its resistances to recollect Heidegger, its refusal to speak in the words of precursors, even as they are being imitated otherwise. If Gasché stresses reflective recollection (*Andenken*) as "face-to-face" confrontation, it is a confrontation where the face-to-face is critically elided even if philosophically reinforced. Gasché's account of reflection is particularly important, because it defines retrogression already in Heidegger as

the very movement of differentiating (*krinein*) between what shows itself in and by itself and what does not—*what is* in all its forms. As such a differentiation, a retrogression manages the radical space of the ultimate ground of what is. That ground is a "function," so to speak, of the regressive differentiation and dismantling of the tradition. More precisely, it is itself of the order of that dismantling retrogression, of an appearing through retreat; moreover, the operation of dismantling is itself grounded therein. This ground grounds when it is set free in the very act of returning to it. Such a ground, since it can never be given, cannot become the end point of a reflection. As one reaches out for it reflectively, it withdraws.²¹

Whereas Gasché addresses thought, I would prefer to apply his penetrating consideration of recollection as differentiation and

stepping back as a translation of writings wherein going forward reflectively implies a dismantling of the tradition by allowing things to appear through a writing that is *en retrait* (in retreat even as it steps ahead) insofar as it steadfastly refuses to remember and hence pay its debts to the assessments of time.

Re-collecting Heidegger

Readers familiar with Derrida's work will have recognized in the discussion of *phthora* many of the main arguments of "The White Mythology," and certainly the parallels between Derrida's study of metaphor in Aristotle and Heidegger's translation of a text by Anaximander reflect a strong identification between Heideggerian philosophy and deconstruction. In fact, such parallels implicitly establish an understanding between the informed reader and Derrida that Heidegger has more than merely anticipated the main features of a deconstructive discourse. In this sense deconstruction fits into a philosophical context of thoughts which were rigorously developed in the late 1930s. "The White Mythology" could be read as a reenactment of a relation between text and temporality that has already transpired in Heidegger's analyses of the significance of translation in "The Anaximander Fragment." And this raises the interesting fact that in Derrida's reinscription of Heidegger's notion of *Unterschied* (difference) under the signature of difference, in not only "The White Mythology" but in "Ousia et grammè" and "La différance," Derrida performs Heidegger's philosophical strategy of translation or transcription and inscribes deconstruction into that Heideggerian history. Moreover, it is in the translation of Heidegger's German into French that *Unterschied* succumbs to the metaleptic slippages of difference—*différance*. In itself, this slippage in French is a metaphorical transposition in which the abrasion of words—the removal of an "e" and substitution of an "a"—becomes evident, an abrasiveness of language which becomes one of the main topics of "The White Mythology."

A consequence of this linguistic "abrasion" is the differentiation of deconstruction from Heideggerian thinking. And, of course, in metaleptically engaging Heidegger's play of sub-

stitutions or translations, deconstruction will come to stand in place of that which it has worn against: "The Anaximander Fragment." This abrasion between discourses authorizes Derrida not to explicitly point out the parallels, for one of the main tasks of essays like "The White Mythology" is to put themselves in place of something which has gone before and in so doing to become metaphorical reenactments or performances both of what is called a white mythology—in this case, the presupposition that deconstruction could be reduced to its original, which is to say, Heidegger's philosophy—and of a deconstructive notion of metaphor that is not reducible to a specific referent. As reflection or recollection, "The White Mythology" metaphorically substitutes itself for what has already been said, in this case, Heidegger's "The Anaximander Fragment." In taking the place of Heidegger's essay, "The White Mythology" allows itself to forget it, just as the translations of Anaximander by Plutarch and others left the original in or as oblivion.

That "The White Mythology" performs a Heideggerian text such as "The Anaximander Fragment" is evident when one focuses, for example, on Derrida's interest in the term *usure* to signify a wearing and tearing of words in an economy of metaphorical substitutions, though *usure* also refers to the usury of language, the production of a surplus value by means of lending and borrowing words, a negotiation which concerns translation, transcription, transference. This is contextualized in terms of Anatole France's *The Garden of Epicurus*, though it is clear Derrida is also thinking about Nietzsche's writings on metaphor in *The Genealogy of Morals*, where culture is situated with respect to notions of indebtedness, usury, reciprocity, substitution, and metaphysical translation. The "white mythology" concerns the idealistic presupposition that beneath economies of words there exists a pure, unadulterated language which is only approximated by the usurious economies (*usure*). This is a mythology which does not exist in time and which can be said to be metaphysical. The white mythology is, according to Derrida, a fantasized scene inscribed in white ink, an invisible design covered over by a palimpsest. This design is an after world, a place of metaphysical speculation that evades the "assessments of time," a phantasm that negates writing as both

temporal (historical) and spatial (writerly). For Derrida the question is how to move from this theology of writing to the philosophy of writing, a philosophy that in the Nietzschean sense can take account of the usury of day-to-day exchange, of that transference or translation which is always already corrupted even as it gathers value.

Most important is that through this *usure* (or *phthora*) we are to understand the temporalization and spatialization of meaning. Thus Derrida asks: "How are we to know what the temporalization and spatialization of meaning, of an ideal object, of an intelligible tenor, are, if we have not clarified what 'space' and 'time' mean? But how are we to do this before knowing what might be a *logos* or a meaning that in and of themselves spatio-temporalize everything they state? What *logos* as metaphor might be?"²² Whereas Heidegger speaks of a fragment, Derrida speaks of transcription as metaphor, corroborating a Heideggerian reading of *logos* which is not, as Heidegger says, "the expressing of a word-meaning" (i.e., denotation) but "rather a letting-lie-before in the light wherein something stands in such a way that it has a name."²³ This suggests not a term but a manifold of relations whose constitution comes about through the *phthora* or *usure* of transcription, transference, carrying-over, or metalepsis. Meaning does not subtend these relations but is the effect or excess which arises from overdetermination. More important, it is through the transportation of words that the notions of space and time are related, for the effect of the history of philosophy is to posit notions of space (limits, boundaries, breaks, fragments, wholes, bodies, ensembles) and time (history, telos, founding, continuity, succession, the arche, and futuricity). Moreover, space and time are dependent upon the abrasions or errancies of words as they are transmitted through space and time, that is through the canon, the institution, scripture, culture, nationhood, and so on. These aspects of spatiality and temporality are themselves "figures" of speech through which writing must pass in order to become legible. Meaning is usually thought of as atemporal and nonspatial and therefore opposed to metaphor which is, according to Derrida, both temporal and spatial; yet, there can be no meaning which does not pass through the "figure" or figuration of history.

The Performance of Metaphor

If “The White Mythology” can be read as a metaphorical substitution that performs “The Anaximander Fragment,” should we not become attentive to the question of the performative or performance itself? This question is crucial to our concerns, because instead of developing a criticism that takes place in an other’s words, Derrida performatively translates or transfers the other’s words into his own deconstructive discourse, allowing words like *usure* to function metaphorically for something else that cannot be recovered as an “original” or “originary” concept. In other words, a text such as Heidegger’s “Anaximander Fragment” itself becomes a white mythology as far as deconstruction is concerned.

Several quotations from “The White Mythology” are relevant in respect to a performative reading of metaphor: “It is impossible to dominate philosophical metaphors as such, *from the exterior*, by using a concept of metaphor which remains a philosophical product”; and, “The philosopher will never find in this concept anything but what he has put into it, or at least what he believes he has put into it as a philosopher.”²⁴ Both of these remarks indicate rather strongly that for Derrida metaphor cannot be divorced from a notion of performance, since metaphors comprise a specific act wherein the difference between what is “proper” and what is “improper” is transgressed by an act of will. However, what is the “subject” of this act? Who or what wills?

In *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Heidegger includes the essay “Who Is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?” (“Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra?”) and focuses on the figure of the teacher who performs philosophy. The teacher’s performance is a temporal transition from the prior through the now to what lies beyond, the future. And in discussing this performative aspect of Zarathustra’s teaching, Heidegger writes, “Still, it remains to be considered whether the inquiry beyond Nietzsche’s thinking can be a continuation of his thought, or must be a step backward.”²⁵ Zarathustra’s performance of philosophy does not transpire teleologically as academic intellectual history; rather, it breaks with this notion of time in articulating within it a proximity of moments which ruptures self-identity and the

positing of a consciousness whose thought is unified in a manifold of compatible and teleological moments. To recall Gasché's remarks once more, Heidegger is considering the performance of the continuation of thought as the retrogression wherein philosophy undergoes dismantling.

The manner in which Zarathustra pronounces the [fundamental features of time] points toward what he must henceforth tell himself in the foundation of his being. And what is that? That "One Day" and "Formerly," future and past, *are like* "Today." And the present is like the past and like the future. All three phases of time merge as one, as the selfsame, into a single present, an eternal Now. Metaphysics calls the permanent Now "eternity." Nietzsche, too, conceives the three phases of time from the standpoint of eternity as a permanent Now. But for Nietzsche, the permanence does not consist in something static, but in a recurrence of the same. When Zarathustra teaches his soul to say those words, he is the teacher of the Eternal Recurrence of the same.²⁶

This eternal return, as Heidegger suggests in "The Anaximander Fragment," is not very much unlike the translations of Anaximander: the eternal repetition of that which is known as that which is unknown, the familiar as the unfamiliar. The eternal return disconfirms identity and introduces difference which is disruptive to our everyday conceptions of temporal movement. Zarathustra's performance of philosophy—his teaching—deconstructs identity and difference as a principle of noncontradiction. Heidegger situates this destabilizing of identity and difference in terms of a performance of philosophy as temporal event in which a teacher wishes to cross over to another philosophy which can never be thought, merely, from beyond where one begins. Heidegger calls this condition the nearness of what lies afar.

But the nearness of what lies afar brings to our attention also a notion of Aristotelian metaphor as that figure which is near though it refers to something far away, perhaps something so far away that it is not entirely recoverable. "There is metaphor," Derrida writes, "only in the extent to which someone is supposed to make manifest, by means of statement, a given

thought that of itself remains inapparent, hidden, or latent.” Still, as Aristotle’s writings disclose, metaphors do not necessarily produce analogical closure. Rather, metaphor “risks disrupting the semantic plenitude to which it should belong. . . . metaphor also opens the wandering of the semantic.” The risk of metaphor, then, is the chance of missing what is apt or true. “If metaphor, the chance and risk of *mimesis*, can always miss the true, it is that metaphor must count with a determined absence.” Referring to Aristotle’s example, “sowing around a god-created flame,” wherein something with essentially no name (the sun’s casting forth its flames) is equated with an action that has a determinate name (sowing), Derrida acknowledges the problem of reference by calling such a figure an “‘enigma,’ a secret narrative, composed of several metaphors, a powerful asyndeton or dissimulated conjunction” describing what Aristotle calls “an impossible combination of words.”²⁷ Perhaps Derrida should have called this metaphor a “disseminative conjunction” wherein the action of bringing together what is near (the act of sowing) and far (the sun’s scattering of rays) can no longer be reduced to self-identity and therefore to the representation of an agency’s thought that is self-contained or “proper to man.” Disseminative conjunctions, in other words, exceed the mimetic recovery of the subject. They exceed the determinable action of analogizing, which is recoverable as a self-identical act through interpreting the metaphor back to its performative source. Such a reduction to the act of metaphorization is, of course, a reduction to a temporal present, or now, in which the metaphor eternally presents itself. However, a disseminative conjunction would be symptomatic of a differentiation of the act of analogizing and the disruption of a temporal reduction to a moment which can always be retrieved as something eternally there. In short, the disseminative conjunction divides the temporal performance that is metaphor or analogy, the bringing together what is near with what is far.

In Heidegger’s “Who Is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?” philosophy is being read from the standpoint of performative analogies that break the metaphysical horizon of temporality as that which is self-identical and determined within the moment of the now. As Fredrick A. Olafson clarifies in *Heidegger and the*

Philosophy of Mind, Heidegger's philosophy works against the classical view that time as events and processes belong to a totalized world wherein all entities are occupying the same temporality. "This is because *Dasein* is the entity that *has* a world, as trees and rivers do not."²⁸ Olafson's remarks point out that Heidegger dismisses the classical objectification of the subject whose temporal subjectivity has to be subordinated to the objectivity of a world-time wherein all moments are fixed according to an overall schema that is identical to itself. Such a schema, as Olafson notes, can be conceptualized only from a transcendental and eternal point outside of itself.

What is never explained, however, is how the referential power of this transcendental position and of its tenseless present is established in such a way as to make it invulnerable to the skeptical doubts that stem from the presentness of all the representations of those who are placed *within* world-time. To all appearances, this [transcendental] standpoint is simply assumed to be available so as to make up for the limitations that the theory of world-time imposes on the representational activity of those who occupy positions in it and thus secure against skeptical doubts the referential capacity that we are nevertheless so sure we possess."²⁹

Heidegger's "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" interrogates Nietzsche's analogies of the near and the far in order to investigate an alternative notion of temporality wherein a representational activity or performance breaks with the classical assumption of a transcendental present, or now, through which self-identity (presence itself) is metaphysically conceived. Nietzsche himself, Heidegger argues, had already begun dismantling this classical conception of time through his interrogation of both "the will to power" and "the eternal return." Not surprisingly, Heidegger views these phrases as a questioning of the relation of beings to Being, a point clearly made in "The Anaximander Fragment."³⁰ In fact, "the eternal recurrence" is the name, according to Heidegger, of the Being of beings (in Derrida's terms the difference of difference), and "the will to power" is the persistence of that eternal recurrence. At the end of "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" Heidegger notices an analogy. The

snake and the eagle which enigmatically soar in the air above Zarathustra respectively represent the eternal recurrence and the will to power. This analogy stands for “the belonging-together of Being and human being” to which the *Übermensch* is in horizontal relation. The *Übermensch* breaks with the classical manifold of world-time, since it is not simply a name for someone who is to arrive at some moment, like a metaphysical notion of the Messiah, or the name for some deliverer who is already here, like a Siegfried. Rather the *Übermensch* is a subject constituted as the relation which is “the belonging together of Being,” as eternal recurrence or return wherein metaphysical ontology is dismantled and the “event” of the *Übermensch*’s coming is disengaged from a classical notion of world-time. We must emphasize that if the *Übermensch* is to be considered a subject, it is one whose action or performance as a subject never comes into being as anything other than a metaphor or disseminative conjunction which brings together what is near and what is far in such a way that a metaphysics of self-identity and world-time is eluded. This accords well with Gilles Deleuze’s perception that for Nietzsche the eternal recurrence is the “repetition of difference.” And one might say, considering Heidegger, that Zarathustra marks the relation between the persistence of repetition and the difference of difference.

In moving to such a position, Heidegger notices that Nietzsche has written, “This, yet this alone, is *revenge* itself: the will’s aversion to time and its ‘It was.’” Whereas pre-Socratic philosophers like Anaximander view temporality as a parceling out of things due, the classical tradition which came afterward was oriented to time much more in terms of a confrontation: the subject judges the moments of time rather than submitting to time’s law. Nietzsche calls this revenge, according to Heidegger. “Revenge is aversion to the ‘it was’ within time.” And the aim of revenge is to make the past present so that we can adjudicate events that are no more, or hold on to time, merely, as something which abides. Metaphysics is revenge on time in that it “posits eternal Ideals as the absolute, compared with which the temporal must degrade itself to actual non-being.”³¹ We can now see why the texts by Aristotle that were considered by Derrida reject metaphors which are disseminative conjunctions: they do not hold on to the eternal present of a past

moment and therefore time cannot abide in them. In short, in performing such metaphors the action of revenge against transience and nonbeing fails. In Nietzsche's texts, Heidegger notices, there is a "yes" to time that would "have transience abide" in its always coming to be as something other, which is to say, as eternal return. This return, in the context of Nietzsche, is the return of metaphor, the translation of translation, as the performance of a disseminative conjunction wherein the "subject" crosses over to the *Übermensch*, and the near is bridged with the far.

In "The White Mythology" such a view of metaphor is reflected in the following passages.

Presence disappearing in its own radiance, the hidden source of light, of truth, and of meaning, the erasure of the visage of Being—such must be the insistent return of that which subjects metaphysics to metaphor.

To metaphors. The word is written only in the plural. If there were only one possible metaphor, the dream at the heart of philosophy, if one could reduce their play to the circle of a family or a group of metaphors, that is, to one "central," "fundamental," "principal" metaphor, there would be no more true metaphor, but only, through the one true metaphor, the assured legibility of the proper. Now, it is because the metaphoric is plural from the outset that it does not escape syntax; and that it gives rise, in philosophy too, to a *text* which is not exhausted in the history of its meaning (signified concept or metaphoric tenor: *thesis*), in the visible or invisible presence of its theme (meaning and truth of Being).³²

The notion that tropes do not escape syntax is fundamental to Nietzsche's remarks on rhetoric, collected by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, and suggests that philosophy itself could be considered to be metaphor.³³ This approximates Jean-Michel Rey's thesis in *L'enjeu des signes: Lecture de Nietzsche*, in which Rey argues that philosophy for Nietzsche is explicitly a metaphorical detour in whose syntax the subject is deconstructed.³⁴ A similar reading of metaphor is already suggested in "The White Mythology" when Derrida writes:

Metaphor, then, always carries its death within itself. And this death, surely, is also the death of philosophy. But the genitive is double. It is sometimes the death of philosophy, death of a genre belonging to philosophy which is thought and summarized within it, recognizing and fulfilling itself within philosophy; and sometimes the death of a philosophy which does not see itself die and is no longer to be refound within philosophy. [. . .] This supplement of a code which traverses its own field, endlessly displaces its closure, breaks its line, opens its circle, and no ontology will have been able to reduce it.³⁵

Heidegger calls this supplement of a code which traverses its own field the teaching of Zarathustra, the yes to time which carries its death within itself. “The White Mythology,” of course, sights this death not in Nietzsche but in Aristotle; yet, in so doing it functions as an analogy or metaphor for other philosophies, since it is itself a disseminative conjunction that breaks the metaphysical horizons of an academically inspired intellectual history. By recollecting Aristotle, Derrida asks us to remember Nietzsche and Heidegger, both together, and apart—both (together and apart): at once/separately.

Reading To Apeiron under Erasure

In the previous sections we noticed that Heidegger and Derrida are not so far apart in their performance of the philosophical tradition as a wearing and tearing of metaphors or the *phthora* of translations significant for the dismantling of a classical conception of temporality and the subject. But we must recognize, too, that even if such an agreement of views and approaches can be located, we can also find close approximations that reveal a fundamental distance. A very good example is the way in which both Heidegger and Derrida share a sophisticated mode of reading that tactically disregards or fails to recognize what in terms of the Anaximander fragment is a crucial word that points to a consideration of temporality that implicitly rejects a classical concept of world-time: Anaximander’s *to apeiron* (the undetermined). Although Heidegger’s

“The Anaximander Fragment” is explicitly a commentary on Anaximander’s phrase wherein the *apeiron* is being investigated, Heidegger dismisses the term en passant. To some extent this is in keeping with the fragment which itself does not say the word *apeiron*, though it has generally been agreed upon ever since antiquity that Anaximander’s fragment is explicitly about this term. Heidegger’s essay, of course, indirectly acknowledges the fact and does not disregard the term *apeiron* because of skepticism over its relevance to Anaximander’s fragment. Rather, Heidegger’s essay reperforms this lacuna as if the *apeiron* could be adequately talked about only “under erasure” or in eclipse. This is an “erasure” Derrida will respect, too, in his remarks on Heidegger’s “Anaximander Fragment,” though the erasure becomes acutely troublesome, because Derrida does not make the effort to let a reader unfamiliar with Anaximander know that Heidegger is addressing a text explicitly addressing a term wherein the *différance* between Being and beings is openly acknowledged in ways that are not taking place wholly within the Western metaphysical tradition. Here we begin to notice that a reading of terms under erasure may well reflect what Nietzsche called the “will to deception,” wherein knowledge comes about not through *a-letheia* (unforgetting) but by *letheia*, or forgetting itself. Indeed, Heidegger underscores this attitude when he writes in “The Anaximander Fragment” that “error is the space in which history unfolds.”³⁶ Both Heidegger and Derrida “err” in remembering or recollecting the *apeiron* by disregarding or forgetting it. Both, therefore, are writing about that which remains “under erasure” even if its traces can still be recognized in “other” words, which is to say, in that process of translation which is metaphor.

But if Heidegger and Derrida share in interpreting that which is under erasure, it is precisely here that Heidegger takes his distance from the more deconstructive possibilities which he could not have easily missed, whereas Derrida takes the occasion to inaugurate a philosophical vocabulary that we call deconstruction. That this divergence or difference between Heideggerian and Derridean philosophies may be a matter of the “difference” of metaphors, or the wear and tear of translations, I will leave aside, bearing in mind the previous discus-

sions of metaphor as “disseminative conjunction” and of Heidegger’s sensitivity to translation as metalepsis. However, what is clear from the perspective of an interpretation of Heidegger is that the effacement of the *apeiron* is not accidental, since “The Anaximander Fragment” from *Holzwege* is not the only text by Heidegger that we have on the fragment of Anaximander. It is, rather, a very canny reperformance of an earlier text written in the summer of 1941, namely the seminar entitled “Das anfängliche Sagen des Seins im Spruch des Anaximander.”³⁷ And interestingly enough, in this text the *apeiron* is discussed at length in the context of a translation by Heidegger of Simplicius’s rendering of the Anaximander fragment, a translation almost completely effaced in the rendition Heidegger gives in “The Anaximander Fragment” from *Holzwege*. That this earlier translation engages the *apeiron*, whereas the later one omits it, reflects the “erasure” noted above.

Since *to apeiron* is a complex term with a substantial history among scholars of pre-Socratic texts, we ought to review some background in order to demonstrate Anaximander’s formulation of a term which not only anticipates Heidegger’s radical critique of metaphysics but also announces the advent of what Derrida will call *la différance*. Of most concern, naturally, is not that Anaximander can be seen as the genuine precursor or “original” that stands behind these contemporary philosophers, for this would simply reenact a “white mythology.” Rather, we should appreciate how the *apeiron* marks a phantomized locus wherein Derrida’s reperformance of Heidegger’s performance of Anaximander is established as an interplay of imitations which turn away from their original and its valorization as origin in order to disclose its truth.

In discussing what Heidegger in *Holzwege* and Derrida in “Ousia et grammè” have left “under erasure” we need to consider the translation of Simplicius rendered by C. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven: “. . . some other *apeiron* nature, from which come into being all the heavens and the worlds in them. And the source of coming-to-be for existing things is that into which destruction, too, happens, ‘according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time,’ as he (Anaximander) describes it in these rather poetical terms.”³⁸ Simplicius’s reference to the

apeiron is mediated by Theophrastus and, of course, Aristotle, and it refers to the primary or originary substance on which the cosmos is based: the “indefinite,” or as that which is the “between” of elements. Kirk and Raven write: “Aristotle, when listing various monistic theories of the *physiké* on a number of occasions speaks of a substance *between* the elements—normally between fire and air or between air and water. In three or four of these passages it looks as though Anaximander is meant as the proponent of an intermediate substance, not because he is directly named but because the substance is implied to have been called simply *to apeiron*.”³⁹ Aristotle’s interpretation of *apeiron* as an intermediate substance either alongside or mixed in with the elements is, Kirk and Raven point out, false with respect to being a position of Anaximander, since Anaximander himself had a much more abstract notion in mind. That is, for Anaximander *to apeiron* signified something “indefinite in kind” or “spatially indefinite.”

Abstracting from Aristotle’s position, Werner Jaeger in *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* preserved the common-sense reading of *to apeiron* as that which was borrowed from familiar sources. However, his definition also transcends such historical reductionism, for he defines *to apeiron* as the boundless “from which all Becoming draws its nourishment, not that which is qualitatively undetermined.”⁴⁰ This view marks an adherence to an essentially Aristotelian definition of *to apeiron* in *The Physics*, where it stands for the notion of the indefinite. However, George Burch, in the 1940s, stressed the idea that *apeiron* probably meant something more like “the indefinite,” which is a meaning Kirk and Raven accept as much more accurate. Burch argued that *to apeiron* signified a notion of Godhead with no definable attribute, and he notes that the indefinite is tracked precisely in terms of the oppositions of the elements in whose ontological difference, as Heidegger might have called it, this indefiniteness and boundlessness are disclosed as manifesting limits. Here the *undecidability* of boundlessness/boundedness is clearly brought to the forefront of considering Anaximander’s *to apeiron*. Furthermore, Burch argued that, in the fragment, existence as a definite thing is considered unjust, for “we are encroaching on each other by our existence.”⁴¹ And the only way to atone is by passing into oblivion.

Such a view complements, quite obviously, the views Heidegger maintains about nihilism in the texts of Nietzsche written at about the time of "The Anaximander Fragment," and it also has parallels in Heidegger's translation of the fragment.

Another scholar of classical texts, Harold Cherniss, challenges this theological reading of *to apeiron* and argues that neither consciousness nor volition are related to the *apeiron*. Anaximander's "unlimited" or "boundless" is composed of "ingredients so thoroughly mixed together as to be severally indiscernible in the mixture but which when segregated from the mixture are recognizable as all the differences of the articulated world."⁴² *To apeiron* refers not to a primordial chaos but transcends such marking off, since it is an unlimited and unbounded multitude which is in everything yet distinct, being in matter but neither as matter nor as pure spirit. *To apeiron* is, to use Derrida's idea once more, an undecidable with respect to its manifestation in nature, and one cannot therefore define it within the metaphysical or philosophical categories familiar to Western thought. This, of course, is why for Heidegger the Anaximander fragment is so appealing and why he chose to retranslate it.

Paul Seligman, in *The Apeiron of Anaximander: A Study in the Origin and Function of Metaphysical Ideas*, argues that *apeiron* in Anaximander is both monistic and dualistic, hence breaking with noncontradiction, and he takes seriously the metaphorical presentation of the term *to apeiron*, for the term circumscribes as metaphor even as it evades or fractures boundedness, just as it does by hovering between the monistic and the dualistic, participating undecidably in both and neither. This view suggests that *to apeiron* can only be grasped as itself a translation or displacement, as a term that evades the kind of categorical appropriation typical in Aristotle's *Physics*. *To apeiron* at best is an analogy whose signified is undetermined, a metaphor that as in Heidegger's account of analogy in "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" breaks the metaphysical horizons of closure. According to Seligman, Anaximander was deeply aware that the notion of origin was not reducible to anything, that origin is, to borrow Derrida's vocabulary, inherently differed and deferred from itself.

In the 1941 seminar on the Anaximander fragment, Heidegger

ger takes his distance as a translator from philology, something that reappears in the Anaximander essay collected in *Holzwege*. “We cannot demonstrate the adequacy of the translation by scholarly means,” we read in “The Anaximander Fragment.”⁴³ And in the seminar, “The translation will draw the fragment away from us and leave us in an astonishing and disturbing place.”⁴⁴ The translation distances or, as Heidegger puts it, “ent-fernt.” The seminar clarifies that the purpose of translating the fragment is to dismantle the philological (i.e., metaphysical) apparatus of philosophy and what we would today call its nineteenth-century humanist underpinnings. The seminar maintains that the notion of world or cosmos which translators have assumed in rendering the fragment is an inappropriate conception for pre-Socratic thought, as is the focus on ethics. In fact, what Heidegger has set out to dismiss is the received idea that the fragment has to be interpreted in terms of “the unity of a grand religious, ethical, rational, and physical mode of thinking.”⁴⁵ Once there was no physics and no physical mode of thinking, no ethics and therefore no ethical mode of thinking, because these categories had not yet been articulated or constructed. As in “The Anaximander Fragment,” Heidegger is most concerned with analyzing those precategorical aspects of reflection in which the question of Being is raised, as if Anaximander’s fragment were key to grasping what in section 32 of *Being and Time* was called a “forestructure of understanding,” in this case a forestructure that anticipates the history of metaphysics even as it presupposes its main concerns. The seminar touches on the *apeiron* in this context by interpreting it in relationship to the terms *genesis* and *arché* in order to establish that whatever we call the origin is inherently divided, or, as Derrida might put it, differed and, with respect to “prior” terms, deferred, meaning that the relation between what comes earlier and later is disarticulated. There is also an attempt to structure the *apeiron* metaleptically in terms of an iteration of words beginning with the letter “a”: *a-letheia*, *a-rché*, and *a-peiron*. In examining these terms, Heidegger takes a radical step: he articulates the terms as what Derrida in *Of Grammatology* will call a trace structure, meaning that each of these “archaic” terms comes before and after one another, that they are all traces of prior traces and as such “belong” together or

“bear” on one another insofar as in their coming to presence they are said or decreed in a temporality wherein chronological retrogression to the origin is affirmed even as it is effaced. In coming to presence, then, these terms are disclosed or unconcealed as not present in themselves but only in relation to being affirmed or decreed in the context of other terms. This may occur, Heidegger argues, because the prefix, “a,” drifts over the boundaries of words and is itself what might be called “boundary drift.” The “a,” in Greek, marks a lack or privation similar to our prefix “un,” and Heidegger argues that the prefix does not stand for something negative but simply resists boundedness. “Das a bezieht sich auf Grenze, Begrenzung und Entgrenzung” (“The a concerns itself with limits, limiting, and de-limiting”). The Anaximander fragment, then, is the decree that announces the being of Being as boundaries of language which are proximate entities wherein notions of limit, limiting, and delimiting bear on one another. Hence terms like *a-letheia*, *a-rché*, and *a-peiron*, although they can be defined singularly, are, in fact, identical. “Sie selbst ist das Selbe. Dieses Selbe, die Verfügung (*arché*), dieses Selbe, das *a-peiron*, ist *to chreon* . . .” (“It itself is the same. This itself, the decree [*arché*], this itself, the *a-peiron*, is *to chreon* . . .”).⁴⁶ Heidegger, in his concluding section to this seminar goes so far as to suggest that in the Anaximander fragment is disclosed the relation of Being to time which occurs not in our saying “Time is . . .” but in saying “It is time.” For Heidegger, the “saying” that “it is time” means that time is recognized as arriving, as going, as occurring. Time is the coming to pass of the saying as the delimitation of Being’s coming to presence in language, and as such time transpires in the relatedness of words that cross their own zones of specificity. The truth of time, then, is the truth of the relatedness of *a-letheia* to *arché* and *a-peiron*: the unconcealment of their identity in difference and their difference in identity. Time, in short, is to be detected in the spacing of metalepsis, or the *espacement* of the “a,” wherein presence comes forth as that which abides in the saying of philosophy.

Heidegger’s seminar of 1941 on the Anaximander fragment corresponds to the classical scholarship on the *a-peiron* to the extent that the term has gained recognition as an “undecidable” radical. Moreover, Heidegger has gone beyond much of the

scholarship by suggesting that the *apeiron* cannot be localized and examined as a single term or entity. Rather, the *apeiron* appears and disappears in the drifting and clinging of the prefix “a” that gives rise to determinate terms even as it effaces or places them under erasure. Even more crucial, perhaps, is that already in this analysis a linguistic turn has been made. The relation of Being and time is suddenly examined in the context of linguistic drift, in the metalepsis or translation of words that disclose how time abides as Being and Being abides as time. However, in “The Anaximander Fragment” from *Holzwege* this intensive examination of the metalepsis of language is downplayed, even as it remains active in the contexts of translation and history. Indeed, one must wonder why Heidegger’s “Anaximander Fragment” conceals the analysis of *to apeiron* in the 1941 seminar as well as its implications for a theory of time which will emerge prominently much later in the essay “Zeit und Sein” (1969).

Heidegger’s Metaphysical Resistances

Given the examination of what lies “under erasure” in “The Anaximander Fragment,” to say nothing of the scholarship on the *apeiron*, it is curious that Heidegger’s meditations on the undecidable drifting of the Greek prefix “a,” (and, later, Derrida’s perceptions concerning *la différance*) are already inscribed in the *arché* of the oldest philosophical text vouchsafed to us by Occidental thought. As if at the beginning there was undecidability, difference with an “a”, an “A” which signs for *apeiron*, *aletheia*, and *arché* (not to mention, in Derrida’s contexts, *différance*). This return to Anaximander is, without doubt, what Heidegger and Derrida would view as a necessary eternal return, one affirming that the ground of thought locates itself in the eclipse or “forgetting” of the *to apeiron*. That the function of translation or transposition as I have outlined it may contribute to a philosophy of forgetting in which the *to apeiron* is obliquely coming forth as trace should be borne in mind.

Still, such an orientation, however consistent with much of Heidegger, cannot be said to accord fully with his thinking

overall. This is reflected in studies like David Halliburton's *Poetic Thinking* when in his interpretation of "The Anaximander Fragment" he develops another Heideggerian view of history.

Over the centuries—in Heidegger's account of history—the sense of the presently present gradually becomes dominant, bespeaking as it does its nearer relation to unconcealment, so that *eonta* comes to stand for what is present here and now in the same way that the present-at-hand (as depicted in *Being and Time*) comes to stand for beings in general. The irony is that in the process we have forgotten the relation that inspired the dominance in the first place: and to say that we have forgotten the relation between presence and unconcealment is to say that we have forgotten to think about the nature of presence, this being tantamount to saying, again, that we have forgotten Being.⁴⁷

Phrases like the "presently present gradually becomes dominant" indicate that we are being asked to consider Heidegger from the perspective of eschatology. If Being is becoming unconcealed, we, at the same time, have forgotten to think the nature of presence. This, too, is eschatological if one recalls the apparent Christian parallels. The parousia of Christ is being fulfilled through history even if as time elapses we are more apt to forget his second coming. This is the irony upon which every Christian sermon is founded: we have forgotten Christ who has come for our redemption and who is at hand, who "comes to stand for beings in general." Such an interpretive context for Heidegger represents a pietistic and theological view of Being in a metaphysical context of the unforgetting (*aletheia*) and revelation of God's presence. And it is an interpretation relying on the classical notion of a "world-time" diverging strongly from a view of the *apeiron* which discloses temporality as an inherently divided or deconstructed manifold of moments, a manifold in which the metaphysical notion of "origin" is obliterated.

Not surprisingly, Derrida's deconstruction is committed to a reading of Heideggerian texts challenging the views of interpreters like Halliburton whose writings could be said to re-

cover metaphysics and ignore the occasions in Heidegger's work for dismantling the metaphysical tradition. Yet, we should acknowledge that Heidegger's dismissing the *to apeiron* in "The Anaximander Fragment" can be interpreted as marking not merely a radical departure from the metaphysics of intellectual history but also a pietistic resistance to the more metaphysically challenging seminar of 1941. And this, certainly, might justify interpretations of readers like Halliburton. Without doubt, Heidegger's dismissing and ignoring of the *apeiron* functions as a double gesture which, in disclosing the "undecidable" in its very "forgetting," also discloses outright rejection and resistance to an "undecidability" perceived to be a threat to Heidegger's meditations on the nature of Being.

Naturally Derrida is very much aware of this "conservative" Heideggerian position which maintains rather than breaks the metaphysical tradition, and Derrida's rhetorical posture is explicitly directed against this conservative dimension in Heidegger's thought, while the performative identifications with Heideggerian strategies function to disclose how at the same time a conservative maintenance of the metaphysical tradition contains within it those elements which are capable of deconstituting the grounds upon which that maintenance is predicated. The performative in Heidegger, too, assesses time as *to apeiron* whose indeterminacy implies a nihilistic wear and tear on that which is given by Being. The *apeiron* is not simply a genesis in which Being is gathered, or a forgotten origin, but a temporal *retrait* in which Being is at once revealed and concealed, given and obliterated. *To apeiron* is neither the beginning nor something which comes after; rather, it transpires in a manifold of temporality whose moments are constituted in "boundary drift." In such time Being is at once appropriated and disappropriated, as Heidegger will notice of time in "Zeit und Sein." Thus *to apeiron* is that moment in which time as something linear (time as *grammè*) and ontologically determinate (*ousia*) is violated or negated. Yet if Heidegger invokes such a notion of time, and especially in the seminar of 1941, his reading of ontology also views such a radical concept of time as threatening to the notion of Being whose proper understanding requires metaphysics.

A key passage in Heidegger which Derrida expects us to

keep in mind occurs in “Over ‘The Line’” wherein one again explicitly recognizes how strongly Derridean deconstruction is resisted by Heidegger. This is a particularly important passage because it is a crucial context for the coining of the neologism deconstruction (it is a metaphor), as well as a context disclosing an incipient orientation of Heidegger to this term.

The restoration of metaphysics is the restoration of the oblivion of Being. This restoration turns towards the essence of Metaphysics. It entwines itself around it through that towards which this essence itself yearns, insofar as it summons that zone which lifts it into the freedom of its truth. . . . It is hardly possible to surpass the grotesqueness (*das Grotteske*) of proclaiming my attempts at thinking as smashing metaphysics (*Zertrümmerung der Metaphysik*) to bits and of sojourning at the same time, with the help of those attempts, on paths of thinking and in conceptions which have been derived—I do not say, to which one is indebted (*zu verdanken*)—from that alleged demolition (*Zertrümmerung*). There is no gratitude needed here, but some reflection. However, the lack of reflection (*Besinnungslosigkeit*) already began with the superficial misinterpretation (*oberflächlichen Missdeutung*) of the “destruction” (“*Destruktion*”) which was discussed in *Being and Time* (1927) and which has no other desire than to win back the original experiences of metaphysics as conceptions having become current and empty in the process of abandonment (*Abbau*).⁴⁸

Heidegger’s resistance to the *to apeiron*, or his “forgetting” of the term in “The Anaximander Fragment,” may be motivated by the strong antipathy above to the notion of “smashing metaphysics.” For in his “obliteration” or “forgetting” of the term *to apeiron*, Heidegger allows for that absent signifier or proper name to return *as metaphysics*, wherein the “original experiences of metaphysics” are “won back.” In not talking about Anaximander’s term in its own terms, Heidegger resists its conceptual power to threaten metaphysics, and this resistance is precisely what Derrida wants to overcome. Indeed, the passage above is one of the sources for Derrida’s repeated insistences that one cannot simply step outside of or beyond

metaphysics, that the resistance to overcoming metaphysics is itself part of Western thought and not so simply dismissed. This, Heidegger is already saying, was one of the major weaknesses of the thesis of *Being and Time*, that it did not respect the resistance from within metaphysics to its own overcoming. Curiously enough, the passage from “Over ‘The Line’” suggests that it is itself a moment when Heidegger had felt his project was too bold in its intent to surpass or go beyond an intellectual history which is the metaphysical tradition. In his earlier essays, Derrida highlights Heidegger’s resistances in contrast to his own much less nostalgic approach to philosophy.

As the scholarship on the *to apeiron* shows, Anaximander’s formulation of the term is by no means a settled matter among students of the pre-Socratics. But Heidegger’s consideration of the *apeiron* in the seminar acknowledges the term as extremely disruptive from the perspective of traditional ways of considering questions of ontology and temporality. In “The Anaximander Fragment” Heidegger, in acknowledging this disruption, substituted a far less troublesome word in the *apeiron*’s place: *genesis*. Still, even that aspect of “The Anaximander Fragment” which performatively recognizes the *apeiron* from the seminar in its more destabilized senses comprises one of Heidegger’s more important attempts to reformulate what in *Being and Time* had been called the radical temporal clue, and Derrida’s “Ousia et grammè” is extremely significant for Heidegger studies in that it recognizes this possibility (again, before Heidegger’s seminar on Anaximander was published in 1981) and points the way for us to begin comprehending how the abandoned project on time in *Being and Time* was by no means given up but reworked later in contexts that appear to be fairly remote from those in the earlier work.

Derrida’s earlier essays suggest that in order to grasp Heidegger’s philosophy one must engage in an assessment of his attempts to settle the question of temporality with regard to Being. Moreover, Derrida suggests that Heidegger was, in the earlier work, looking for a radical temporal clue by means of which to destroy metaphysics but was either not able to come up with such a radical temporal formulation or, for pietistic reasons, resisted doing so. In reperforming the *to apeiron* Hei-

degger does, according to Derrida's analysis, formulate the radical temporal clue discussed in *Being and Time*, but in formulating it, Heidegger carefully conceals or "erases" its most radical and destructive consequences for philosophy. To overcome this resistance, however, Derrida must himself reperform the Heideggerian project so that its radical temporal clue will come forth.

From Apeiron to Différance

If we noted Derrida's reperformance of Heidegger's "Anaximander Fragment" in "The White Mythology," it is also important to recognize how Derrida reperforms the *to apeiron* which he, too, has "forgotten" in order to better disclose it. Indeed, this reformulation could be seen as the *raison d'être* for the key article to deconstruction, "La différence." Quite evident is that the essays, "La différence," "Ousia et grammè," and "Les fins de l'homme," collected in *Writing and Difference* belong to a suite of articles in which essentially the same questions are interrogated from very different perspectives. "La différence" might best be considered a fragment or missing portion of "Ousia et grammè" in which a reading of "The Anaximander Fragment" addresses the *to apeiron* in order to disclose deconstruction's indebtedness not only to Anaximander but to Heidegger's reading of the Anaximander fragment. For "La différence" develops passages in "Ousia et grammè" by positing the term *différance* as it concerns the difference between Being and beings. One suspects, in fact, that had Derrida merged these two essays our understanding of *la différence* might have been much altered through contextualization.

In "La différence" Derrida writes, "In this text ["The Anaximander Fragment"] Heidegger recalls that the forgetting of Being forgets the difference between Being and beings."⁴⁹ And quoting Heidegger, Derrida notes, "*The oblivion of Being is oblivion of the distinction between Being and beings.*"⁵⁰ This leads to a consideration of the trace: "What Heidegger wants to mark is this: the difference between Being and beings, the forgotten of metaphysics, has disappeared without leaving a trace. The very trace of difference has been submerged. If we

maintain that *différance* (is) (itself) other than absence and presence, if it *traces*, then when it is a matter of the forgetting of the difference (between Being and beings), we would have to speak of a disappearance of the trace of the trace.”⁵¹ These words address Heidegger’s implicit remarks on the *to apeiron* and more or less repeat quite literally what Derrida has written in “Ousia et grammè,” though in “La différence” the commentary is extended a bit further. Notable is the fact that whereas Heidegger talks about reinscription of the fragment—its translation—Derrida talks about erasures and trace effects.

Since the trace is not a presence but the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself, it properly has no site—erasure belongs to its structure. And not only the erasure which must always be able to overtake it (without which it would not be a trace but an indestructible and monumental substance), but also the erasure which constitutes it from the outset as a trace, which situates it as the change of site, and makes it disappear in its appearance, makes it emerge from itself in its production. The erasure of the early trace (*die frühe Spur*) of difference is therefore the “same” as its tracing in the text of metaphysics. This latter must have maintained the mark of what it has lost, reserved, put aside. The paradox of such a structure, in the language of metaphysics, is an inversion of metaphysical concepts.⁵²

Derrida’s conclusion is that the present becomes “the sign of the sign, the trace of the trace . . . it is a trace, and a trace of the erasure of the trace.”⁵³

Such a reading of Heidegger is extremely remote from an eschatological interpretation that looks forward to the fulfillment of Being. Indeed, Derrida’s interpretation insists that the *mise en abyme* of traces and erasures takes us “beyond the history of Being, and also beyond our language, and everything that can be named in it.”⁵⁴ We now see another reason why Derrida has refused to engage explicitly Heidegger’s discourse on translation as historical reinscription: Derrida, unlike Heidegger, sees the history of Being as a trace structure of erasures and effacements. The history of ontology is not a translation of marks or the handing down of textual residues but an un-

writing, a whitening out. From this perspective connections with "The White Mythology" become somewhat more evident, for in "La différence" one notices the white mythology recognizes a presence at the core of Western thinking that is discursively presenting itself to us only under erasure. Also, in "La différence," Derrida notices Heidegger's translation of the ancient Greek term *to khreon* (usage),⁵⁵ which, quite possibly, suggested *usure* in the senses it takes on in "The White Mythology."⁵⁶ Lastly, Derrida acknowledges in "La différence" that *to khreon* is associated in Heidegger with *Über-setzen* (translation) and that the trace of *to khreon* is part of the destiny of the history of Western metaphysics.

In case we had any doubts that Derrida had not seen the subtlety of Heidegger's argument in "The Anaximander Fragment" concerning the relationships of metaphysics to reinscription, or in case we might have had any doubts as to the intimate relationship between an essay like "The White Mythology" and Heideggerian thought, the pages in "La différence" on "The Anaximander Fragment" put all that to rest. Derrida not only is sensitive to the issues I have put forward earlier in this chapter, but he wants to go beyond them in "La différence" by means of analyzing the oblivion of Being, which is the oblivion of textual erasure, the *Destruktion* or deconstruction of discourse. In the destruction of the difference between Being and beings there is revealed not just trace structures but what Derrida is calling *la différence*. This, he says, has no essence and therefore cannot appear: "There is no essence of *différance*; it (is) that which not only could never be appropriated in the *as such* of its name or its appearing, but also that which threatens the authority of the *as such* in genera, of the presence of the thing itself in its essence. That there is not a proper essence of *différance* at this point, implies that there is neither a Being nor truth of the play of writing such as it engages *différance*."⁵⁷ But having said that, Derrida also says, "For us, *différance* remains a metaphysical name, and all the names that it receives in our language are still, as names, metaphysical. And this is particularly the case when these names state the determination of *différance* as the difference between presence and the present (*Anwesen/Anwesend*), but already, and above all, when they state the determination of *différance* as the

difference of Being and beings.”⁵⁸ Derrida’s wish, here, is to go beyond the name, *différance*, itself that “pure nominal unity” as he calls it, in order to posit *différance* as something unnameable, “the play which makes possible nominal effects.” In itself this involves usage and translation, performance and transference. “The nominal effect *différance* is itself enmeshed, carried off, reinscribed, just as a false entry or a false exit is still part of the game, a function of the system.”⁵⁹ To put into question the name of the name is for Derrida the understanding of the trace of the trace as the double gesture of inscription and erasure. This would be to engage that white mythology which is its own demystification, or more aptly, its own demythification.

Heidegger, Derrida says at the conclusion of “La *différance*,” turned back from this going beyond names, for Heidegger seeks the unique word, the “finally proper name,” *Sein*. This is where Halliburton’s reading of Heidegger’s Anaximander essay is so correct, where the eschatology situates itself. But the role of *différance*, Derrida suggests, is never to affirm the properness of a final term. More accurately, *la différence* in breaking with Occidental categories as determined in Platonic and Aristotelian thought is part of a Nietzschean eternal return to a notion whose unnameability is cited in the commentary on Anaximander by Simplicius: *to apeiron*.

Of course *to apeiron* is a temporal marker, and this is most relevant to “La *différance*.” In fact *différance* poses itself as the disclosure of the radical temporal clue Heidegger had only broached without allowing to carry out its mission: the destruction of metaphysics. *Différance*, then, is the formulation of the radical temporal clue toward which the entire Heideggerian philosophical apparatus inclines. That Derrida perceives this, entitles him, according to the argument of “La *différance*,” to claim a success where Heidegger has evidently failed, even if it is a success which could never have taken place without Heidegger’s having preceded Derrida.

In the following quotation the radical temporality of *différance* is set forth.

It is because of *différance* that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-called “present” element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is re-

lated to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element, this trace being related no less to what is called the future than to what is called the past, and constituting what is called the present by means of this very relation to what it is not: what it absolutely is not, not even a past or a future as a modified present.⁶⁰

Already at the outset of this passage, which I am temporarily breaking at this point, one sees the tacit influence of Heidegger's "The Anaximander Fragment," for it is in talking about the "mark" that Derrida is repeating Heidegger's argument about trans-lation or trans-scription. Moreover, Derrida, in considering the mark as that which is trans-scribed through the auspices of difference, begins to notice that from within the act of trans-scription the question of temporality is directly engaged. Trans-scription suggests relations not only of presence but of the present. Derrida continues:

An interval must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval that constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of the present, that is, in our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly substance or the subject. In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be called *spacing*, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space (*temporization*).⁶¹

The interval is not merely a cut or rupture but a punctuation which allows us to see time and being as a manifold of relations which is as much held together as it is pushed apart by the division. Constituting means dynamic dividing. The space is essential in order that relations of being, time, and language can be articulated, disclosed. Lastly, the interval must be thought of at once as the becoming space of time and the becoming time of space. "And it is this constitution of the present, as an 'ordinary' and irreducibly nonsimple (and there-

fore, *stricto sensu* nonoriginary) synthesis of marks, or traces of retentions and protentions (to reproduce analogically and provisionally a phenomenological and transcendental language that soon will reveal itself to be inadequate), that I propose to call archi-writing, archi-trace, or *différance*. Which (is) (simultaneously) spacing (and) temporization.”⁶² Toward the end of the passage Derrida’s reading of Heidegger has led him to view “writing” as the proper context in which to pursue a philosophy seeking to deconstruct the metaphysical bases of Western thought. Time does not exist alone but always already concerns a synthesis of marks disclosing relations of Being (presenting), spacing (intervals, divisions, differences), and signification (translation, meaning, truth).

Much of “La différence” generalizes the homage and critique of Heidegger by means of contextualizing *différance* in various systems of thought. Quite important is Derrida’s challenge to a Saussurean view of language that the notion of the phonemic opposition must give way to a more sophisticated philosophy of differentiation. Here the familiar binaryism characterizing much structuralist thought is under attack from a post-Heideggerian perspective, and this attack is most visible in *Of Grammatology*, where both de Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss come under heavy fire. The strategic gain in mounting such a critique of the distinctive feature of binary opposition is that Derrida can make credible the transposition of ontological questions into a linguistic context in which the trace becomes the track of a mark in differential transit where undecidability transpires.

Heidegger, it is charged, never really attempted to transpose his ontological arguments into a thoroughly linguistic context, though in “The Anaximander Fragment” Heidegger appears to be moving in that direction. Derrida is very keen on making the linguistic transposition because it appears that once a linguistic or literary critical discourse is taken up there is much less metaphysical contamination likely by way of a rhetoric of being. Indeed, consideration of the trace in a linguistic context makes irrelevant Heidegger’s concern with Being as that to which, in Derrida’s reading of Heidegger, all else must be subordinated. By transferring Heideggerian philosophy into a post-Saussurean context, Derrida moves his base of operations

from “voice” to “writing,” from “presence” to “trace.” And yet, in doing so, he has risked a new binaryism, that is to say, a new table of terms which can be divided along an axis of inclusion/exclusion.

In *Of Grammatology* the juxtaposition of phenomenological trace structures and Saussurean linguistics is also significant, since it is here that the question of time in its relation to language and spacing is addressed in terms of Heideggerian method. At issue is the revision of Heideggerian *Sprache* such that it conforms to a philosophy of the trace within which spacing can be viewed as part of an undecidable temporal/spatial relation. *Sprache* itself has the potential for recovering Derrida’s project within a metaphysical framework, and in moving away from the possibility of such a recovery Derrida writes:

It is thus that, after evoking the “voice of being,” Heidegger recalls that it is silent, mute, insonorous, wordless, originally *a-phonic* [*die Gewähr der lautlosen Stimme verborgener Quellen* . . .]. The voice of the sources is not heard. A rupture between the originary meaning of being and the word, between meaning and the voice, between “the voice of being” and the “phoné,” between the “call of being,” and articulated sound; such a rupture, which at once confirms a fundamental metaphor, and renders it suspect by accentuating its metaphoric discrepancy, translates the ambiguity of the Heideggerian situation with respect to the metaphysics of presence and logo-centrism. It is at once contained within it and transgresses it. But it is impossible to separate the two. The very movement of transgression sometimes holds it back short of the limit.⁶³

Producing this fault or division with regard to the voice of being is the repetition of the question: “Because it is indeed the *question* of being that Heidegger asks metaphysics. And with it the question of truth, of sense, of the *logos*. The incessant meditation upon that question does not restore confidence. On the contrary, it dislodges the confidence.”⁶⁴ That Heidegger finds it necessary to interrogate Being, that this interrogation is itself the structure of an iteration whose obsessiveness verifies

the gaps, lacks, or traces in the object of inquiry, dislodges our confidence in the notion of piety as an attempt to preserve or respect the integrity of its object. Rather, piety resembles skepticism. By way of the repetition of the question of Being, through the iteration of the language of being, the history of ontology is always already deconstituted by way of a temporal clue which is hidden in the folds or creases of the questions, in those repetitions or numerous false starts. The repeated question is the structure of Being's history, the textuality of Being, the written of Being; the trace structure of Being as being has disclosed itself to us through the lived record of time. By asking the question of Being, Heidegger discloses "that 'being,' as it is fixed in its general syntactic and lexicological forms within linguistics and Western philosophy, is not a primary and absolutely irreducible signified, that it is still rooted in a system of languages and an historically determined 'significance,' although strangely privileged as the virtue of disclosure and dissimulation."⁶⁵ Derrida's argument is that Heidegger's entire philosophical project is a reading of Being whose destiny is to discover that Being appears only in the track of its own being-written, and that "nothing escapes the movement of the signifier" which is, as we noticed in "La différance," a temporal/spatial movement.

Everything is to be read within the horizon of the temporal, a horizon that is disclosed to us within the history of the meaning of Being, or, to put it another way, within the history of a certain discursive practice. And yet, what does time mean in this context? Whenever Derrida touches on this kind of problem it is the "signifying trace" which comes under close scrutiny.

To come to recognize, not within but on the horizon of the Heideggerian paths, and yet in them, that the sense of being is not a transcendental or trans-epochal signified (even if it was already dissimulated within the epoch) but already, in the truly *unheard of* sense, a determined signifying trace, is to affirm that within the decisive concept of ontico-ontological difference, *all is not to be thought at one go*; entity and being, ontic and ontologi-

cal, “ontico-ontological” are, in an original style, *derivative* with regard to difference, and with respect to what I shall later call *différance*, an economic concept designating the production of differing/deferring. The ontico-ontological difference and its ground (*Grund*) in the “transcendence of *Dasein*” . . . are not absolutely originary. Différance by itself would be more “originary,” but one would no longer be able to call it “origin” or “ground,” those notions belonging essentially to the history of onto-theology, to the system functioning as the effacing of difference.⁶⁶

This passage from *Of Grammatology* does not emphatically discuss temporal significance of the ontico-ontological difference, and yet the phrase “all is not to be thought at one go” is extremely important, because Derrida is arguing that the temporal clue which is elicited by the ontico-ontological difference is itself a manifold of relations that are not presented all at once in a now but are also not all concealed in an *arché* or *eschaton* either. The difference, or *différance*, breaks radically with a Kantian teleology, which views time as linear, progressive, continuous. Time, from a post-Heideggerian perspective, is anything but such a linear movement of the history of being or meaning; rather, time is a manifold of relations in which the difference between moments is itself undecidably given in a trace structure in whose indeterminacy the various modalities of time (*arche*, moment, lapse, *eschaton*, duration, present, past, future, suspension) are given not simultaneously but also not unsimultaneously.

In uncovering this interpretation of time within the interpretation of text as the “movement of the signifier,” Derrida benefits from the rhetoric of ontology without becoming distracted by the question of Being as nostalgically seeking a plenitude within *parousia*—the revelation of Being. *Différance* becomes the complex marker by means of which a temporal consideration of the question of Being allows us to read the history of ontology in a way that does not simply dismiss teleology as has often been done within various religions. Rather, in recognizing the continuum of temporality *la dif-*

férance has the effect of deconstituting from within a continuous teleological structure, a path of thought moving from origin to end.

Throughout this chapter we have been considering those points at which deconstruction is positioned close to the work of Martin Heidegger. Although Derrida's stance(s) with respect to Heidegger has never been anything else than highly ambivalent, we do notice in Derrida's earlier essays the extent to which Derrida's philosophy identifies itself with Heidegger and where it explicitly distances itself. Indeed, Derrida, who probably did not, in the 1960s, have access to Heidegger's 1941 seminar on Anaximander, suggests both indirectly and unmistakably that during the late 1940s Heidegger did see his way to a radical temporal clue but that he resisted bringing it to philosophical fruition because of a resistance (perhaps pietistic) to destroying the metaphysical tradition. Deconstruction, in contrast, formulates that radical temporal clue and repositions it within a linguistic critique which allows the clue to open onto a reflexive demolition that Heidegger wanted to forestall.

Yet, there is another indirect and unmistakable thesis that Derrida appears to be advancing as well. This suggests that Heidegger was not capable of seeing his way to a radical temporal clue at all and that deconstruction has to invent one for him within the loose-ended infrastructures of Heidegger's miscellaneous articles that come after *Being and Time*. This is the thesis to which I turn in the next chapter, wherein we engage those major arguments that are highlighted in "Ousia et grammè" on the philosophical handling of time by Aristotle, Hegel, and Heidegger.

Before I turn to this, there are two last points I want to make about the interrelations between Derrida and Heidegger as I have just left them. First, one can only suppose that the reason both Heidegger and Derrida "forget" to mention the *to apeiron* is, among those already given, that for Heidegger this notion is too strong, in many respects, and that for Derrida it is too weak and therefore needs reformulation. Yet, it is curious, and perhaps ironic, that in their failure to mention the *to apeiron*, Derrida stands in a metaphoric or analogous relation to Heidegger that confirms the Heideggerian thesis of translation, as

if this metaphorical relation were, in fact, but part of a much larger metaleptic chain of substitutive texts that reperform by way of a Nietzschean eternal return the *apeiron* of Anaximander which, as fragment or as trace under erasure, has been given over to oblivion. Second, the materials we have studied disclose points where Heideggerian thought comes into close proximity to deconstruction. However, when Derrida discusses the implicit affinities between himself and Heidegger it is the *to apeiron* of Anaximander that is indirectly involved, and this *to apeiron* is an example of a destructive, disjunct, or disappropriating notion of time. But when Derrida explicitly discusses his distance from Heidegger it will be Aristotle's temporal notion of the *hama* that is raised, that is to say, in terms of a constitutive concept in which moments of time are appropriated. The chiasmus is odd. When Derrida discloses affinities or identities to Heidegger it is in terms of a temporality that forecloses identification. And when he shows his differences with Heidegger he does so in terms of a temporality that forces identification to come about.

Given the philosophy of *différance*, we know that these "different" positions are not simply contradictory but that they are positioned deconstructively, or undecidably. These temporal relationships—*la différence*—are themselves what deconstruct intellectual history as the narrative of conceptual filiation which takes place in what Olafson calls "world-time." But how can an intellectual history of Derrida's relation to Heidegger be written if intellectual history has itself been deconstructed? My sense is that this can be done only as the performance of the deconstruction of intellectual history, a performance which occurs not in a sentence or paragraph or chapter but in the relations between them, relations that form correspondences wherein the bringing near of that which is far transpires as the persistence of an eternal recurrence: the repetition of difference.

T W O

THE EARLY

HEIDEGGER

In the previous discussion of “Ousia et grammè” I have not mentioned the essay’s central or major claims about a lengthy note on temporality in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* (2.6.82). But in eliding the major occasion for Derrida’s remarks, I am recognizing that his astonishing reevaluation of Heidegger occurs mainly in the materials surrounding the interpretation of the note (*Being and Time*, 2.6.82), and that it is in these supplementary remarks that Derrida acknowledges a continuity between Heidegger’s formulations and those of deconstruction as Derrida develops them in the late 1960s. In this chapter, however, I wish to discuss Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s note as part of an interpretation that counters the philosophical sympathies between Derrida and Heidegger. For in this chapter we will encounter an attitude in Derrida’s work that assumes Heidegger never developed a very radical temporal clue, that, in fact, Heidegger resisted the destination he announces in the beginning of *Being and Time*: the undoing of the history of ontology. Naturally, we are limiting ourselves to the early Heidegger. But Derrida’s reading of the note suggests that early and late Heidegger are not so easily differentiated and that discussing them in terms of identity and difference poses enormous problems.

In this chapter I must reconstruct the main outlines of Derrida’s remarks on Heidegger’s note and the tutor texts that Heidegger is discussing before proceeding to discussions of the unwritten parts of *Being and Time* as well as of the lectures written during the late 1920s. I will turn to *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* in order to demonstrate within a text not available to Derrida at the time of writing his essays on Heidegger

during the late 1960s that Derrida's intuitions about the note to *Being and Time* are borne out by evidence that has subsequently been edited and published. In addition, I wish to discuss *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* in order to show that evidence has also emerged that demonstrates Heidegger's capacity to mount parallel arguments to those advanced in *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems in Phenomenology*, which do, in fact, more than anticipate a deconstructive moment, even if it occurs in the working through of a largely existential approach. Lastly, I will discuss Derrida's essay, "The Ends of Man," which, once more, makes the claim that Heidegger resists the radical project he has himself undertaken not only in his earlier but even in his later periods. It is here, once more, that Derrida will distinguish deconstruction from Heideggerian philosophizing, though, as my study will bear out in later chapters, Derrida will retreat somewhat in the mid-1970s from the stringency of these positions, for example, in "Pas" and "The Retreat of Metaphor."

It is well known that in the note to *Being and Time* (2.6.82) Heidegger acknowledges Hegel's conception of time in the *Encyclopedia*, and also the *Jena Logic*, as vulgar, since it establishes the essence of time in a metaphysical now. Heidegger's projected and unwritten sections on time were, in part, meant to provide a long critique of Hegel's formulations in order to uncover from within metaphysical speculations a temporal clue breaking with the history of ontology. Derrida argues that Heidegger was correct in noting that time cannot, as Hegel thought, be considered as some "other thing" or thought of as "otherwise," in Hegel's sense, because in such an estrangement of time one would invent a dialectics resulting in a conception of the "other" of time as merely a replication of a "now" that is presentced.

Derrida reads the notes' remarks on Hegel, as well as its comments on Aristotle, in order to orient the analyses of time as ones that raise the question of difference and identity, being and nonbeing. And, as readers familiar with the overall project of deconstruction can surmise, Derrida wants to show that Heidegger's analyses routinely manage to raise the issues while failing to take a deconstructive turn through which difference would be viewed as something analogous to *différance*. But

Derrida, in making this point, will also attempt to suggest that Hegel and Aristotle were not so crude or vulgar as Heidegger supposes. For in them we can see the repetition of a problem which resurfaces in Heidegger's discourse: the engaging in a discussion of time that the philosopher knows may potentially destroy the very categories of metaphysical thinking by means of which the problematic of time itself was raised. Moreover, the invoking of the problematic of time necessarily brings about numerous aporias or double binds which are so destructive that in addressing the radical aspects of time there must be a gesture or tactics by means of which this appeal can resist the violence it risks. In short, the philosopher wants to release the genie in the bottle but also wants to capture it once again, having seen the damage it is capable of producing. Philosophically, time is easily underestimated as a problematic, and Derrida suggests that even minds like those of Aristotle, Hegel, and Heidegger were not properly oriented in such a way that they could master the philosophical effects of raising the question of time. From the broadest of perspectives, Derrida is also suggesting that perhaps temporality inheres in philosophy as precisely that which cannot be thought and that philosophy poses itself historically as a resistance to the thinking through of time, despite time's attractiveness as a "radical" in metaphysical discourse. Given this view, the relevance of Derrida's interrogation of Heidegger's note becomes quite obvious, since deconstruction is itself inscribed into the Western problematic of thinking about time.

In considering Hegel, Derrida appreciates, above all, the risk involved for the Hegelian system when it attempts to think through the question of time in a way that threatens the coherence of the dialectic. "There is produced in the thought of the impossibility of the otherwise, in this *not otherwise*, a certain difference, a certain trembling, a certain decentering that is not the position of an other center. An other center would be an other now."¹ Hegel, especially, is not afraid to "negate" the now, to introduce "differences" into his dialectics which debilitate closure and presencings of stable nows. And Hegel risks such debilitating and perhaps chaotic effects because he recognizes *difference* itself to be very problematic. "How do space, how do nature, in their undifferentiated immediacy, receive

difference, determination, quality? Differentiation, determination, qualification can only overtake pure space as the negation of this original purity and of this initial state of abstract indifferenciation which is properly the spatiality of space."² Heidegger must have learned from Hegel, Derrida implies, that the history of ontology is largely the history of the problematic of difference. It must have been obvious to Heidegger that if one is going to deconstitute the history of ontology by means of a temporal clue, that from Hegel one learns precisely what that clue or key to time must be: differentiation/identification. However, Heidegger never grasps this key very firmly in *Being and Time*, even though he has its elements under scrutiny. And, curiously enough, it is not until one reads "The Anaximander Fragment" that it becomes clear Heidegger uses the temporal clue, manifest in Hegel's text, in a very displaced context in which the difference of being is under discussion within a text about the assessment of time. The function of Derrida's reading of the note by Heidegger, then, is to reperform the whole argument in order to see and develop a clue in Hegel which Heidegger discusses but does not fully grasp in its overall significance for philosophy. This will be repeated, once more, when Derrida rereads Aristotle along with Heidegger and shows where in *The Physics* the temporal clue suggests itself. But, after these analyses are made, Derrida will reinscribe them in terms of Heidegger's reading of Anaximander, a reading we have considered in chapter 1. And, through all of these analyses, Derrida will be asking, from a polemical perspective, whether Heidegger fully grasped the significance of difference and, if so, why he resisted taking the question to its most destructive consequences. Derrida's interpretation of Heidegger is "layered," then, because his analyses of texts and contexts are meant to be overlaid much in the manner of an "allegory of reading," as Paul de Man has developed the notion.

That Hegel is stressed more in *Being and Time* than is Aristotle and consequently addressed first by Derrida is due to the fact that Hegel's texts on time are much less cryptic and fragmentary than Aristotle's in *The Physics*. In part, this means that one is reading largely from Hegel *into* Aristotle, and especially in Derrida's comments it is evident that Aristotle is mediated by Hegelian thought. In *The Encyclopedia*, Hegel relates space,

time, and the mark through the figure of the point. (As we will see, the figures of point, line, and space are central in Aristotle's remarks in *The Physics*.) Hegel argues that the point both replaces and conserves the undifferentiatedness of space. It delimits (negates) but also articulates (posits) space as undifferentiated. "As the first determination and first negation of space, the point spatializes or *spaces* itself."³ The point negates and retains, but it also extends into line. This *Aufhebung* of the point is the linear truth of the point, its destiny. But the line is itself spatial. Hence, in the negation of space by the point, the stretching of the point into the line only reaffirms, once more, space in terms of the spatiality of line. The negation of space by the point is *aufgehoben* into the affirmation of space as line. It follows in Hegel that time is the negative moment through which undifferentiated space *becomes* differentiated space. "Time is *spacing*," or, "[Time] is the relation of space to itself, its for-itself." Heidegger writes, "According to Hegel, this negation of the negation as punctuality is time."⁴ In terms of ontology this is significant in that the relation of Being to nature is precisely that of space to the point. Nature, in other words, is in a negative, because temporal, relation to Being. Derrida proposes that we reread section 258 of the *Encyclopaedia*, since it is this text that will become quite problematic from the point of view of *Being and Time*. It is, as Derrida says, a truly extraordinary passage.

Time, as the negative unity of self-externality, is similarly an out-and-out abstract, ideal being. It is that being which, inasmuch as it *is*, is *not*, and inasmuch as it *is not*, *is*: it is Becoming *directly intuited* (*das angeschaute Werden*); this means that differences, which admittedly are purely momentary, i.e. directly self-sublating (*unmittelbar sich aufhebenden Unterschiede*) are determined as *external*, i.e. as external to themselves.⁵

Derrida draws three main conclusions from this passage: (1) that a Kantian conception of time is reproduced in it—time as pure form of intuition; (2) that Heidegger similarly accepts that "Time and the 'I think' are no longer opposed . . . they are the same" but that "it is not in time (*der Zeit*) that everything comes to be and passes away; rather, time itself is becoming,

this coming-to-be and passing away”; and (3) the Hegelian determination of temporality allows us to consider the present—“the very form of time”—as eternity. This eternity is like the absolute, neither inside nor outside of time. “Eternity as presence is neither temporal nor intemporal.” For Derrida this means that “presence is intemporality in time or time in intemporality: this, perhaps, is what makes anything like an originary temporality impossible.”⁶ However, it is also true that “eternity is another name of the presence of the present.” And yet this presence is not naively metaphysical but marked by difference of the finite and the infinite. The question Derrida is asking in “Ousia et grammè” concerns how we are to assess *Being and Time*, given that the “application” of Hegel is precisely the context wherein a deconstruction of Western ontology could be carried out by Heidegger, though it is most evidently being resisted, either because Heidegger does not clearly see his way to the deconstruction of ontology by means of the clue to time Hegel offers, or because he sees it but suspects that it might be too disruptive in terms of the philosophical contexts already established in *Being and Time*. Certainly, as we will notice much later in the notes and lectures, which are, to a large degree, parts of *Being and Time* either not included in the volume or treated as ancillary textual materials, Heidegger may have been most interested in working toward a radical temporal clue not by means of interrupting or punctuating a philosophical text—this, indeed, is Derrida’s overriding tendency—but by working through the categories of phenomenology (for example, in *History of the Concept of Time*, which is an early draft of *Being and Time*) and existentialism (*Being and Time*, *Basic Problems in Phenomenology*, and *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*) to the point where a movement from the emphasis upon Dasein gives way to an emphasis on what lies in the “being beyond” of Dasein: that is, time and Being. However, this is an approach that Derrida implicitly views as a liability, since it suggests a forestalling, or resistance, to that philosophical horizon called deconstruction.

Leaving the question concerning Heidegger’s missed opportunity for deconstruction by way of Hegel in suspension, Derrida’s reperformance of Heidegger’s note turns to Aristotle. For it is in terms of *The Physics* that the entire problematic of

time, as Hegel inherits it, is oriented with respect to the metaphysical method of inquiry. Without doubt, Hegel not only draws his examples through parallels with *The Physics* but his conception of negativity is strongly indebted as well to Aristotelian conceptions. In *The Physics*, Aristotle writes: "That time is either altogether nonexistent, or that it exists but hardly or obscurely, might be suspected from the following: One part of it has come to be but no longer exists; the other part will be but does not yet exist; and it is of these two parts that infinite time, or any time one might take, is composed. But it is thought that what is composed of nonbeings cannot participate in *substance*."⁷

It is crucial to acknowledge that *The Physics* is enormously obscure and very difficult to paraphrase, since its remarks are fragmentary, its references largely lost to us, and much of its sense dependent, for us, upon passages elsewhere in Aristotle. Derrida's reading of *The Physics* does not problematize this aspect of the text but assumes we are aware of the traps of interpretation. And, since the stress is upon Heidegger, Derrida chooses to interpret *The Physics* from a distinctly Heideggerian perspective: the idea that Aristotle is most fundamentally concerned with the contradiction that time (nonbeing) can be said to manifest presence (being). In its simplest form the question is, how can nothing (be) something? Aristotle's project, from this point of view, is to justify the paradox, and this is done by thinking of time as presence insofar as in the determination of beings there is the determination of time. In noting the entelechy of time, Aristotle resolves the contradiction of how time as nonbeing is also being.

The last sentence of *Being and Time* asks a similar question raising Aristotle's paradox when it remarks, "Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of *Being*?" And Derrida's analysis in recognizing such a compatibility between Heidegger and Aristotle will develop two points about Heidegger. First, Heidegger's philosophy recognizes that time is not to be considered identical to Being, but second, Heidegger's *Being and Time* does not, in itself, ever go outside an Aristotelian consideration of temporality such as outlined in *The Physics*. Rather, Heidegger's analysis of time at the end of *Being and Time* merely discusses how Dasein is situated in ordinary time, how

Dasein in turning away from its own finitude (death) grasps time as an infinitude in whose presence Dasein feels at ease with itself. More generally, Heidegger argues that the “primordial structure of *Dasein*’s totality of Being” is temporality, and in this sense Heidegger, too, attempts a demonstration of how something secondary to being like time can be shown to be little else than the structure or determination of the totality of Being. In this Heidegger largely repeats *The Physics*.

The significance of this Heideggerian dependence upon Aristotelian thinking is that whereas Hegel offers the opportunity for a highly radical and deconstructive theory of time, Heidegger’s engagement with Aristotle, even through Hegel as mediator, provides a means whereby to retreat into the safety of metaphysics. Derrida, at this juncture, reads once again the theory about the point and the line. In *The Physics*, Aristotle’s reference to time by way of the analogy of the point and the line is a celebrated passage, and Derrida notes that it represents the condition of time from the standpoint of metaphysics. For just as the point is a spatial marker which is essentially nonspatial, the now is a moment in time which is not temporal. The now, in fact, breaks with the continuity of moments in asserting itself as not past and not future. But if the now is not these other moments, is “other” than them, this now cannot be understood except in terms of them, though it is clear that as yet these moments do not exist. When something is said to exist, Aristotle says, then all its parts exist. But with time this is not the case. The now is defined precisely by that which does not exist (it is meta-physical), of that of which it is and is not a part. The now, because it is distinct from the past and the future, is not part of time as a continuum, but then, it would be unthinkable to consider the now to exist as simultaneous with another now. Therefore, while the now in relation to its non-existing moments (past, future) appears in itself to be defined according to that which has no being, the now, insofar as it may not be simultaneous with any other moment, achieves a certain presence as it appears to consciousness. And this, Aristotle knows, is a contradiction. But in having outlined these problems, Aristotle’s text breaks off. “Let this, then, be the discussion of *difficulties* faced in connection with what belongs to time.”⁸ Acknowledging these, the discussion then turns to

the essence or nature of time. Aristotle's consideration of the analogy of the point and the line stresses the metaphysical problematic of the relation of time to being and nonbeing. Yet the analogy is closed off quite abruptly with the flippant statement that such examples are only part of the "discussion of *difficulties* faced in connection with what belongs to time." Why is Aristotle being so casual? Derrida's reading makes such questions more urgent because he notices that at such junctures in Aristotle the history of ontology and metaphysics is being determined, that had Aristotle not closed off the discussion so abruptly, Western philosophy might have taken a different direction. This is not to say that the history of metaphysics hangs in the balance because of one passage or statement, but that in the abrupt cutting off of an argument Aristotle displays an attitude or orientation with respect to questions of being and time which is itself ingrained in him and becomes habitual within the history of philosophy. It is these habits of thinking, of course, that we unconsciously pick up, and, as someone intensely interested in psychology, Derrida is quite concerned with this metaphysical unconscious, the transmission or transference of these habits of thought.

It is, perhaps, impossible to ever know for sure why Aristotle breaks off his analogy of the point and the line so abruptly. Perhaps he thought time was an unknowable concept, perhaps even a pseudo-concept, and that it was better left to thinkers like Anaximander or Heraclitus. But if one reads Aristotle's *Metaphysics* another answer is suggested. We recall that in the *Metaphysics* the analogy of points and lines is raised once more, but in this case the analogy is meant to answer the question of what is an *arché*, or beginning: "'Beginning' means: The first point whence a thing's movement proceeds, such as the beginning of a line or of a road which has an opposite end." Aristotle also says, "What all beginnings have in common is that they are points of departure either for being, or becoming, or knowing."⁹ In other words, the analogy of the point and the line suggests not time's relation to the problem of being/nonbeing but its determination and direction in the orientation of Being. This means that Aristotle can put aside the paradoxical formulations about how time is both nothing and something with the implicit understanding, among his students, that time is a

becoming under the sway of being. And this is precisely how St. Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on *The Physics* will read the analogy of the point and the line: "Aristotle says that that which was said about time and the 'now' agrees in a certain way with what is found in a line and a point. For a point makes a line continuous, and divides it insofar as it is the beginning of one part and end of another."¹⁰ Without doubt, Aquinas is not aware that the analogy of the line and the point refers to the metaphysical question about the contradiction of time's being at once nothing and something. Rather, for him the metaphysics of entelechy is preeminent.

It could be argued that Derrida's reading of Aristotle has to invent a self-critical moment in metaphysics when the question of being is subjected to temporal scrutiny, when, in fact, Aristotle is merely dismissing what to him are endlessly arguable speculations about the paradox of time which are of no practical value for *The Physics*. Derrida argues, of course, that Aristotle is not dealing squarely with the question of time but is merely evading it. And ironically, in evading the issue, Aristotle supposedly also poses it. Yet, readers of *The Physics* might well contend that Aristotle is insisting that the kinds of problems Derrida wants to expose are, for Aristotle, nonproblems and that Aristotle is self-consciously ridiculing these old-fashioned metaphysical speculations which date back to Anaximander and probably before.

But whether *The Physics* is the result of a self-conscious elision of analysis whose purpose is to resolve problems in philosophical methods or the product of a philosopher who felt enormously sure of himself and simply did not see enormous problems where later readers have come to be most perplexed matters less than the fact that the textual effects of whatever Aristotle thought pose themselves at a critical juncture in the history of metaphysics. And it is in this sense that Derrida intuits in *The Physics* that the text acts as if time has to be kept under control, unless the philosopher is willing to let it play havoc with the metaphysical system of terms which cannot handle the dissemination of contradiction. This threat of time can be detected, after all, through close reading, though Aristotle may not have been considering it at all, since what he recognizes in *The Metaphysics* is that time is a direction or

orientation of being and that what matters in *The Physics* is the relation of time to number and motion. Certainly, Derrida's analysis of *The Physics* interprets this text as if there, as in Heidegger, the horizons of deconstructing metaphysics or maintaining it for the sake of methodological consistency are always a writerly concern which any philosopher, aware of it or not, will necessarily address as a feature of the ways in which questions like being and time are formulated.

We arrive, in this way, at what for Derrida will be an extremely important juncture in the analysis of Aristotle, the interpretation of the Greek word *hama*. Unlike St. Thomas Aquinas, whose entelechy, itself derived from Aristotle, assumed that *The Physics* demonstrates a unification of moments, or nows, Derrida, who presupposes no such entelechy, demonstrates that the Aristotelian notion of the now is plural and disseminative: "In Greek *hama* means 'together,' 'all at once,' both together, *at the same time*. This locution is first neither spatial nor temporal. The duplicity of the *simul* to which it refers does not yet reassemble, within itself, either points or nows, places or phases. It says the complicity, the common origin of time and space, appearing together [*com-paraitre*] as the condition for all appearing of Being."¹¹ Of course, Aristotle himself tacitly acknowledges this, and Derrida's achievement, if we are convinced by him, is to have found in the metaphysical doctrine of becoming, as outlined in *The Metaphysics*, a logic of the discontinuous, unlinear, or plural. The now belongs to a constellation of temporal features which are not reconcilable within a continuum of becoming into an entelechy.

The Physics, in Derrida's opinion, reveals a structure not dissimilar from that in "The Anaximander Fragment," a structure of undecidability, of *la différance*. And it is this unmetaphysical network of relationships that can be detected from within the armature of Aristotle's metaphysical alibis. Derrida's analysis, of course, is the result of the key given him by Hegel, who points us in the right direction without himself detecting in Aristotle a network of relations deconstituting or deconstructing the metaphysical armature, reflected in its plenitude in St. Thomas Aquinas's commentary on *The Physics*. Heidegger, who notices Hegel's important clue—difference—still fails be-

cause he cannot read Aristotle's famous analogy of the point and the line so that *hama* becomes the term for the difference of difference, the mark for that limen which cannot determine even as it determines the fate of philosophy. Yet, Derrida has made this breakthrough having himself intuited the radicality and importance of Heidegger's own analysis of difference in his reading of a fragment by Anaximander. Recall once more the quotations from "Ousia et grammè" cited in chapter 1: "The determinations which name difference always come from the metaphysical order," and "Beyond Being and beings, this difference, ceaselessly differing from and deferring (itself), would trace (itself) (by itself)—this *différance* would be the first or last trace if one still could speak, here, of origin and end."¹² Notice how these conclusions are both supported by the reading of Anaximander, a pre-Socratic, and of Aristotle, a philosopher who comes after Socrates. Derrida suggests that Anaximander and Aristotle are metaleptic variants of one another. And this contradicts Heidegger's thought that Anaximander and Aristotle are thinkers who inhabit radically different philosophical frameworks. In this sense Derrida, in reperforming and transposing Heideggerian thought, reveals blindspots in Heidegger's analyses. However, in the discussion of *hama*, Derrida, in developing the aporias that Aristotle inherits from Anaximander, suggests that such aporias prohibit *The Physics* from establishing satisfying hypotheses on time and being, because such aporias initiate metaphysical concepts of time and being eluding adequate definition. Therefore, even if one can take the metalepsis of intellectual history further than Heidegger did, one will find that even in such instances a metaphysical recovery becomes apparent.

Grundprobleme

Although Derrida has closely examined the implications of a note concerning time in *Being and Time*, he makes no mention of the conditions under which *Being and Time* were written, no attempt to recover that history concerning the abrogation or fragmentation of the treatise. Indeed, an adequate history of this subject has as yet to be outlined, but there

is enough published material now to suggest that Heidegger had written extensive materials paralleling those included in *Being and Time* which offer much evidence enabling us either to corroborate or to disconfirm Derrida's intuitions based on his reading of a particular note. Of interest, too, is a recent essay by Thomas Sheehan, a somewhat conservative reader of Heidegger, who has documented the history of the composition of *Being and Time* as well as outlined the background notes on temporality which Heidegger was developing at about the period when he was completing *Being and Time* in 1926. The essay is very informative, given our interests, and it is entitled "Time and Being, 1925–1927."

Sheehan explains that one of the determining conditions for the shape of *Being and Time* was Heidegger's attempt to gain academic promotion at Marburg. It is a typical story of someone who has promised much but who had delivered very little in the way of publications, and thus when the question of Heidegger's promotion to Nicolai Hartmann's chair was raised, Professor Rudolf Wedekind wanted to know when Heidegger would publish work demonstrating his capacities as a philosopher. The controversy at Marburg over this issue forced *Being and Time* into print, though, oddly enough, even after the Ministry of Science, Art, and Education at Berlin had reviewed the proof pages submitted for the promotion in 1926, it had declared them "inadequate." As Sheehan says, Heidegger "had published *and* perished." More important, however, are these remarks: "He had rushed his 'long-guarded work' into print and in so doing had 'ventured forth too far too early,' perhaps chiefly in an effort to get a job. That venture was to block the fulfillment of his philosophical program for years to come."¹³ Sheehan's hypothesis is that because of academic politics, Heidegger's reflections on being and time were prevented from developing gradually and ineluctably at their most critical and formative stages. Just at that point, then, when the radical temporal clue was to be formulated, the entire work upon which Heidegger had been reflecting was forced into print, hence rupturing the complex network of relationships that were steadily growing and transforming. And, of course, Heidegger was unable to recover what would have been his train of